dis-stasis

Linked Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless indicated. See concordance for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance is in pdf format.)

analysis II, 401, 414
disintegration
dis-stasis II, 403, 405-406 (objective-analytical dis-stasis)

NC II, 467-472

Twilight, 126

splitting up NC I, 3 (split up into various modal aspects), 34 (philosophical-theoretical attitude approximates time in the analytic splitting up of the aspects, which nevertheless retain their coherence)
uiteen-breken I, 47
uiteen-stelling I, 5, 46
II, 401, 404, 406, 415

Our naive experience is characterized by enstasis and systasis. There is an integral experience of the coherence of meaning and a continuity of cosmic time.

See my 2011 article, “Enstasy, Ecstasy and Religious Self-reflection:A history of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas of pre-theoretical experience.”

Dis-stasis is caused by the Gegenstand-relation in theoretical thought (NC II, 467-72). It is the splitting apart of our enstatic experience by the abstraction from the continuity of cosmic time. This splitting apart is an ‘uiteen-stelling‘ as opposed to the ‘in-stelling‘ of enstasis. Dis-stasis results in a dis-continuity. Dis-stasis is the is the “analytical dissociation of our experience in its different modal aspects” (Twilight, 126).”

Dis-stasis is an analytical setting-asunder of time and temporal reality. In synthesis we try to recover the continuity of time. But theory, even in its Ideas, can only approximate time (NC I, 34).

In theory we attempt to isolate. When we isolate an individual “thing” we are already engaged in theory. Dooyeweerd says that this dis-stasis is an objective possibility in the logical aspect of reality itself” (NC II, 467-72). There is no resistance as long as the analytical aspect is only “inherent.” But as soon as we use it (i.e., as soon as we engage in theory), there is resistance. Theory relates to a Gegenstand that does not correspond to what we experience in naïve experience; it does not have ontical reality, but is only intentional. Any theoretical consideration of a “thing” sets up the Gegenstand relation. We can make a further dis-stasis, in meta-theory, where we look at the meaning of the aspects as separated out from each other.

But not every use of the logical aspect results in such dis-stasis. There is a naïve use of logic, and a naïve use of concepts. In Vernieuwing en Bezinning, Dooyeweerd says that we must first learn to count with an abacus, and the balls. Later, we learn to count by abstraction. Dooyeweerd also says that in naïve experience we make distinctions among the realms of inorganic, organic and animal. Such naïve concepts are qualitatively different from theory, since theory is Gegenständlich and naïve experience is not. So just because we have a concept does not mean that we are engaging in theory. Nor does it mean that what we are doing is only different in degree from theory, and that theory is a kind of “higher abstraction.” Concepts alone are not what is distinctive about theory. What is distinctive is the setting apart or dis-stasis, and then the subsequent synthesis. Such synthesis demands Ideas (as well as concepts), and a relation to our supratemporal selfhood.

Baader refers to theoretical abstraction as an “Entstellung” (Werke 8, 356). This seems to correspond to Dooyeweerd’s “uiteen-stelling.” He seems to have the same idea of theoretical abstraction as an uiteen-stelling. He speaks of it being an “auseinander und nacheinander.” And he also relates Gegenstand to an over-against [gegenüber].

Revised May 15/06
Ju14/11 Added reference to 2011 article; Dec 24/16

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