Linked Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless indicated. See concordance for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance is in pdf format.)
II, 303 (immanence philosophy identifies the object with that to which spiritual activity of thought or will is directed)
NC I, 42 (in subject-object relation, objective funcitons and qualities are unreflectingly ascribed to things and natural events in modal aspects where they do not appear as subjects themselves)
Dooyeweerd uses the word ‘object’ in a very different way than we are accustomed to. In the British empiricist tradition, an object is something that exists independently of us, and that we then perceive by our senses. The object has certain primary qualities that exist whether it is perceived or not. There are then certain secondary qualities that are perceived by us subjectively, but that do not inhere in the thing itself. Both Baader and Dooyeweerd reject the possibility of a thing existing in itself (“Ding an sich”). Dooyeweerd says that the so-called secondary qualities are object functions within the thing itself. His rejection of any idea of a Ding an sich is related to the view of humanity as the supratemporal or religious root:
In contrast to mankind, neither the inorganic elements nor the kingdoms of plants and animals have a spiritual or religious root. It is man who makes their temporal existence complete. To think of their existence apart from man, one would need to eliminate all the logical, cultural, economic, aesthetic, and other properties that relate them to man. With respect to inorganic elements and plants, one would even need to eliminate their capability of being seen (Roots 30).
We become aware of objects in the subject-object relationn. This relation characterizes naive experience. It is different from the Gegenstand-relation that characterizes theoretical thought. A Gegenstand is not the same as an object.
Revised Dec 27/04