Linked Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless indicated. See concordance for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance is in pdf format.)

knowing II, 410
thinking I, 6, 16, 35, 37, 44-45, 50, 52
II, 408, 497
pre-theoretical thought NC I, 29 (the as yet closed structure of the logical aspect in pre-theoretical thought), 41 (naive concept formation is directed not towards aspects but toward things or concrete events).
theoretical thought NC I, 40 fn1 (theory can also analyze the analytical aspect itself, but only in its opposition to non-logical aspects; this theoretical act is not identical with the abstracted modal strcute of the logical aspect)

See also theoretical.

thought I, 9, 132
II, 401, 406, 495NC I, 7 (process of thought can be performed only by the selfhood)

Thinking is an act that is qualified by the logical aspect. Like all acts, thought functions in all aspects. Not all thought is theoretical. Naive thought is enstatic. Naive thought is characterized by the subject-object relation. Naive thought is an inner-directed thought [‘indenken’]. Naive thought is also limited to psychical perception (II, 404).

Theoretical thought has the setting-over-against attitude. It is a dis-stasis of our experience of temporal reality, followed by a synthesis.

Although thought functions in all aspects, Dooyeweerd sometimes speaks of the logical aspect as the function of thought (II, 402, 408, 495). I believe that this is because ein the Gegenstand-relation, the logical aspect is set over against the other aspects, and only the logical aspect has this capability. Since the aspects are functions of our selfhood, in this opposition between aspects we are functioning as if our logical aspect were our thought. There is a temptation to forget that this functioning of the logical aspect is temporary.

Anticipatory structural moments find expression in the logical aspect only in the theoretical attitude of thought (NC I, 29).

Revised Dec 27/04; Dec 24/16