truth

Linked Glossary of Terms
(references to De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, unless indicated.See concordance for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance is in pdf format.)

Truth I, 24, 30, 54, 81, 83, 129 (structure of truth), 132-133
II, 424, 492, 496NC II, 564 (standing in the Truth), 571 (religious fulness of Truth; Truth shall make you free), 572 (any hypostatizing or absolutizinig turns truth into falsehood), 596, 598 (seized hold of in our hearts by Truth itself)

Standing in the truth is contrasted with standing in falsehood. Falsehood is the radical lie of believing in our own autonomy. Truth is therefore related to our acknowledgement of being subjected to God’s law, and of the meaning character of our reality.

Metaphysical thought tries to discover and prove truths that are absolute above time (“Van Peursen’s Critische Vragen bij “A New Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Philosophia Reformata 25 (1960, 97-150, at 141). But at p. 142 of this article, he says this must not be misunderstood. A transcendental critique show that the boundaries of thought cannot mean a separation between such thought and the religious [supratemporal] point of departure of thought, because philosophical thought stands in a one-sided relation of dependence to this point of departure. A truly radical transcendental critique of thought thus necessarily leads us above the boundaries of philosophical thought, so that it arrives at reflection on the central motive force which the religious Ground-motive exercises on our thought. And at that point, philosophy must be silent, and we can only speak of religious acknowledgement and maintenance of the Truth.

There can be no partial truth. Truth is relativized by the absolute Truth (II, 492). Theoretical truth is limited and relativized by [but not to] the temporal horizon and is in every respect dependent on the full super-temporal truth. We cannot truthfully know the cosmos outside of the true knowledge of God (II, 561).

Sometimes the New Critique speaks of ‘Verity’ (NC II, 572). But the word translated is the same, ‘Waarheid.’

Within theoretical thought, Dooyeweerd has some version of a correspondence theory of truth. We form images which we compare. These images must correspond to what is given in reality.

A correspondence view of truth within theory is also evident in his view of the Gegenstand-relation. Because the Gegenstand has been lifted out of the temporal coherence, it does not correspond to ontic reality. It is an intentional object, understood in the sense that we have by abstraction willed ourselves by the epoché to leave the temporal coherence.

Dooyeweerd distinguishes this view from that of a copy theory of reality. As I understand it, Dooyeweerd’s view is different because a copy theory assumes that things exist in themselves and are copied in our mind.

There is also a view of correspondence implied in the Idea of analogy between aspects. Aspects have analogical relations because they are differentiations from the same totality of meaning.

Revised Jan29/08; Dec 24/16

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