

Individuality, Enkapsis, and Philosophical Anthropology

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Introduction

What is a thing? Dooyeweerd says that a thing is made up of two or more “individuality structures” interlaced together in an “enkaptic” relationship. We need to understand what Dooyeweerd means by these terms. This is made more difficult by the fact that most reformational philosophers—even those who claim to follow Dooyeweerd—reject or misinterpret these ideas in his philosophy.

In the 1970’s, I was a student at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam. One of the first lectures I attended was by Hendrik van Riessen, who was then the head of the philosophy department. I had read Dooyeweerd’s *New Critique*, and I had attended the Institute for Christian Studies, where we discussed the distinction between individuality structures and things.¹ I raised a question in class about this, and Van Riessen said that what things are is just based on “common sense.” I knew that Dooyeweerd believed that the issue is far more complex, so I pursued my question. Van Riessen got very angry and left the classroom, slamming the door behind him. I knew then that I did not want to pursue a doctorate under his guidance. Van Riessen was far too dogmatic and inflexible for a scholarly approach to philosophy. This was a huge disappointment to me. I had learned the Dutch language, and had obtained a Dutch government scholarship to study the philosophy of Dooyeweerd. To my surprise, I found that most of the faculty were not really interested in pursuing his ideas or in reading what he actually said.² I did have the opportunity to personally meet with Herman Dooyeweerd, who confirmed that the directions taken by some in the philosophy department were contrary to his philosophy.³

Dooyeweerd obtained his ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis from Martin Heidenhain (1864-1949), Theodor Haering (1884-1964), and Max Wundt (1879-1963).⁴ They proposed the idea of individuality structures as a way of avoiding Aristotle’s idea that things are based on

¹ Kent Zigterman published his M.A thesis at the Institute on this topic (Zigterman 1977). Zigterman suggests a new idea of substance. Lambert Zuidervaart follows Zigterman’s view, in his article “Fantastic Things: Critical Notes Toward a Social Ontology of the Arts,” 60 *Philosophia Reformata*, (1995), 37-54.

² One exception was André Troost. I could have pursued a doctorate under him, as did Willem Ouweneel, but I was not aware of this possibility.

³ In particular, Dooyeweerd told me of his strong opposition to the ideas of Danie Strauss with respect to the nature of theoretical thought. Strauss was a student of Van Riessen, and had just completed his doctoral thesis. In Dooyeweerd’s last article, he wrote a devastating response to Strauss. The language used by Dooyeweerd is so strong that much of it was deleted in its English publication. See my translation, which includes the full version (Dooyeweerd 1975).

⁴ Max Wundt was Professor of Philosophy at Tübingen. He should not be confused with his father, Wilhelm Max Wundt (1832-1920), the founder of experimental psychology and the predecessor to Felix Krüger at Leipzig. Max Wundt distinguishes between two directions of philosophy: (1) those philosophies that begin with the idea of totality, and (2) those that have an “additive” view of reality, beginning with individual parts that are then added together to form a mere “sum of parts.”

substance. They opposed the logicistic view of things in terms of substance and properties. Instead, they situated things in a larger holistic relationship to Totality (*Ganzheit*).⁵

Almost 20 years ago I wrote about Dooyeweerd's idea of enkapsis (Friesen 2005). I referred to Dooyeweerd's philosophical anthropology—that our body (as distinct from our supratemporal selfhood) is constituted by four interwoven enkaptic individuality structures. But I left discussion of that to a later time. The present article shows how this same idea of four interwoven individuality structures is already found in Theodor Haering's philosophical anthropology. Dooyeweerd relied on Haering far more than he acknowledged. This article will also show the continuing misinterpretation of Dooyeweerd by most reformational philosophers.

Dooyeweerd's ideas are linked, often defined in terms of each other, and frequently used in ways that are unfamiliar or even contrary to normal philosophical usage. I noted this when I made my hypertext translation of some of the key passages in his *New Critique of Theoretical Thought*, with more than 13,000 hypertext links.⁶

The problem of Individuality

What makes a thing unique? What makes it an individual? According to Aristotle, humans are unique by virtue of their soul. We will look at the idea of soul later, when we discuss Dooyeweerd's philosophical anthropology. Inorganic things are frequently said to be individuated by virtue of their properties. This is often formulated in Leibniz's law of "indiscernibility of identicals"—that numerically identical entities share exactly the same properties. But as Rieppel says in his discussion of Heidenhain, this conception of individuality is logicistic and atomistic:

This...logical conception of individuality is atomistic: the individual, a "particular" is a substantial, indivisible entity located in time and space, instantiating essential, intrinsic properties. *Logical* individuals sort into classes, subject to the membership relation (Rieppel 2017, 184).

This atomistic and logicistic view of the nature of things was opposed by Heidenhain and Haering. The history of concept of enkaptic hierarchy shows the insufficiency of classical philosophical approach of individuating individuals through essential intrinsic properties (Rieppel 2017, 198). Yet, as we shall see, this atomistic and logicistic view of the nature of things is the one that is maintained by most reformational philosophers! It is no wonder that they do not understand Dooyeweerd, who emphasized the dynamic nature of things, and opposed an atomistic view:

Owing to this [the plastic character of the structural principles of individuality] the dimension of our experiential horizon that is turned to the inexhaustible wealth of individuality does not show a rigid, atomistic character, but represents itself in a continuous dynamic-structural coherence (NC II, 558).

⁵ Already in 1921, Haering spoke of the "individual structure" of the related totality [individualstruktur des betreffenden Ganzen] (Haering 1921, 197). Haering speaks of structures, and of functional unities [*Funktionseinheit*] and of individuality unities [*Individualitätseinheit*] (Haering 1926, 92). Dooyeweerd does not use the terms 'individuality structure' or 'enkapsis' until some time after 1930. He previously refers to a 'unity of subject' [subjectseenheid]. In his 1929 work, *Die Struktur der Ganzheiten*, Wilhelm Burkamp speaks of the "structure of totalities." Even in 1930, Dooyeweerd still refers only to an "individual unity of subject functions" (Friesen 2005). Max Wundt says that those philosophers who begin with totality will reject the idea of substance in favour of the idea of structure. In 1940, Dooyeweerd speaks of "totality structures."

⁶ Both the Linked Glossary and the hypertext translation are on my website, <https://jgfriesen.wordpress.com>

Martin Heidenhain (1864-1949)

Heidenhain was an anatomist who opposed the logical and atomistic conception of individuality, and the way that theorists of evolution were using this atomistic conception. He also opposed the idea of substance.

Heidenhain was inspired by the work of Hans Driesch (1867-1941). Driesch proposed a holistic, organic view of things, where the whole comes to dominate the parts; the parts are subordinate to the whole.⁷ But Heidenhain thought that Driesch had not gone far enough. He also rejected Driesch's vitalistic view of what drives this organic unity. Heidenhain sought an integrative approach to anatomy, where structure, development and function would come together in an understanding of the body "in its totality." He saw the body as a hierarchy of divisions [*Teilungshierarchie*], a dynamic and relational system.

Heidenhain contrasted analytic anatomy, which dissects a body into its parts, with what he called a "synthetic anatomy" or *synthesiology* which seeks an understanding of the body "in its totality."⁸ This is a holism [*Ganzheitslehre*].⁹ He refers to "*histosystems*," or complex wholes; they form a *Gestalt* that is more than the sum of its parts.¹⁰ The new whole has emergent properties that cannot be found in the *histomeres* that it encloses. A gene is enclosed (encapsulated) by cells, which are enclosed by tissue, which is enclosed by an organ, which is enclosed by an organism. Each level is an emergent whole that is not reducible to its "parts," the encapsulated wholes. An organism is not just a collection of cells. A whole is not just an aggregate of parts or even atoms. There is both upward and downward causation among the various levels of wholes.

Heidenhain made an analogy to music. He

...compared the "synthesis" of developing organisms to form harmoniously structured complex wholes across all domains of life to the variation of a musical theme, all renditions structured by the same rhythm (Rieppel 2017, 171)

Influence of Heidenhain

We will discuss in more detail the influence of Heidenhain on Theodor Haering and Dooyeweerd. But it is useful to know Heidenhain's ideas have influenced others seeking a holistic view of things.

Heidenhain's ideas were used by the anatomist Alfred Benninghof in his 1930 textbook on anatomy. In particular, Benninghof used the concept of a nested hierarchy of wholes, subject to upward and downward causation, where parts build up the whole a truly organicist biology. These ideas were also used by the holistic zoologist Adolf Portmann, who regarded the potential of living matter for self-differentiation, in hierarchically nested biological systems, to be the most important implication of Heidenhain's synthesiology (Rieppel 2017, 171, 197).

Paleontologist Karl Beurlen (1901-1985) was the first to explicitly portray the tree of life as an enkaptic hierarchy. This hierarchy was "in every respect anchored in natural philosophy

⁷ See Hans Driesch: *Das Ganze und die Summe* [The Whole and the Sum] (inaugural lecture at Leipzig) (Leipzig, 1921). In this book, which Dooyeweerd also owned, Driesch says that these ideas of totality and the sum are Ur-concepts that play a role in every area of knowledge.

⁸ Rieppel 2017, 187, referring to Heidenhain, *Formen und Kräfte in der lebendigen Natur* (J. Springer, 1923), 43.

⁹ Dooyeweerd's philosophy is also embedded in this theory of Totality or *Ganzheit*. See Friesen 2005c.

¹⁰For Heidenhain, a histosystem is a complex whole constituted by an enkaptic relationship with nested or encapsulated histomeres.

[*Naturphilosophie*], holism [*Ganzheitslehre*], and a special theory of knowledge [*Erkenntnistheorie*] (Rieppel 2017).

Olivier Rieppel, curator of evolutionary biology at the Field Museum in Chicago, has recently referred to Heidenhain's work on enkapsis. He says that biologists have looked to the genome for the source of individuation in crops, livestock and humans. The genome is "construed as an essential intrinsic property of any one organism." But the individual genome undergoes constant change, not just from ancestor to descendant, but also during the life-cycle of a given organism. Genomes are essentially dynamic, processual systems. A gene is enclosed (encapsulated) by cells, which are enclosed by tissue, which is enclosed by an organ, which is enclosed by an organism. Each level is an emergent whole that is not reducible to its parts, or to the encapsulated wholes. An organism is not just a collection of cells. A whole is not just an aggregate of parts or even atoms. There is both upward and downward causation among the various levels of wholes (Rieppel 2017, 184).

In their book *Biological Individuality*, Lidgard and Nyhard say that biological individuality can refer "not only to identity but also to unity or wholeness":

Examined still more closely, biological individuality may entail a host of related criteria, among them boundedness, integration, the nature of interaction among parts and wholes, agency or governance of parts, propagation by a variety of means, continuity over time. Comprising or being part of a biological hierarchy, being a potential unit of selection, contributing to theoretical evolutionary fitness, and yes, identity or autonomy (p. 4).

They identify four problems in the discussion of individuals:¹¹

1. individuation, or the delineation of one entity from another, and relationships that unify and are not shared by anything else
2. hierarchy, or the idea of individuals nested into levels. This is the idea of enkapsis, which we will look at in more detail, with an emphasis of how the "whole" is more than the sum of the nested "parts." Even the terms "whole" and "parts" are insufficient, since what arises is a whole new structure that encloses or encapsulates other structures.
3. constitution, or the constituent part of things, their functional relations, and their interactions, as well as the interpenetration of entities and their external environments. This is the idea of individuality structures, which we will discuss further. Haering calls this the "horizontal" dimension of things—how things are structured (Haering 1926, 21, 80). Dooyeweerd would later refer to type laws as the law-side of individuality structures for this idea.
4. temporality: the notion of individuality expressing itself over time. Haering calls this the "vertical" dimension of things, in how things change over time (Haering 1926, 21, 32, 48). Dooyeweerd would call this the subject-side of individuality structures. The duration of things is governed by time and its modal aspects.

In addition to identity, the idea of individuality involves ideas of wholeness, interaction between parts and wholes, propagation by various means, continuity over time, being part of a biological hierarchy, being a potential unit of selection, and contributing to evolutionary fitness.

¹¹ Lydgard and Nyhart 2017, 6.

The dynamic, biological individuals that are parts or wholes within an inclusive network or an enkaptic hierarchy are not to be individuated through intrinsic essential properties, but through the relational properties instead that maintain the causal integration that is a biological individual (Rieppel 2017, 199).

Theodor Haering (1884-1964)

In his 1926 work *Über Individualität in Natur und Geistewelt*, Haering built on Heidenhain's idea of enkapsis. Haering's work is far more detailed, and contains many ideas that appear later in Dooyeweerd's work without acknowledgement, including a philosophical anthropology. Like Heidenhain, and later Dooyeweerd, Haering used the ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis as a way of avoiding the traditional views of individuality based on substance and its properties.

Haering emphasized how his ideas depended on German philosophy, in distinction from the atomistic philosophies of other nations. He regarded German philosophy as taking the middle place between the abstract individualism of non-German Western philosophy, and eastern mysticism. Haering characterized German philosophy in three ways: (1) as having a character of totality that unified the opposites in an ascent from individualism (2) its spiritual idealism that protects German philosophy from naturalism, materialism and positivism and (3) its dynamic nature in contrast to static rationalism and quietism (Thoss, 486). The German mystical tradition and its idea of totality or wholeness [*Ganzheit*] was of special importance.

Haering edited a book on German philosophy, *Das Deutsche in der Deutsche Philosophie*. It contained his own articles on Albert the Great (and the rediscovery of Aristotle's idea of potentiality and actuality), and on Fichte, Schelling and Hegel (and their integrated worldview). It also contained articles on Meister Eckhart, Nicolas Cusanus, Paracelsus, Goethe, Herder, on Jakob Böhme as 'Philosophus Teutonicus' (German philosopher) and others (Kotroni, 42).

The emphasis on totality could easily lead to a totalitarian view of the state. Haering himself said that a nation or Volk can never be an individuality structure—a *Volk* can never be an individual in this sense; at best it is an analogy to the functional unity of a spiritual personality (Haering 1926, 101). Nevertheless, Haering's ideas were used by National Socialism to promote the idea that the *Volk* was the highest organic unity, and that human individuals were to be subordinated to it. And in his book on German philosophy, there are clear indications of his own adherence to National Socialism and the need for a Führer (Thoss, 487; Rieppel 2017, 196).

In 1929, Alfred Rosenberg founded The Battle League for German Culture [Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur]. It emphasized the special nature of German culture, and also asserted a causal connection between race and cultural creativity. Over 6,000 people joined the Kampfbund before Hitler became Chancellor. Felix Krueger and Theodor Haering were among its first members.

Although he adopted the idea of enkapsis, Dooyeweerd tried to avoid this totalitarian view of the state. But, as I have shown in my review of Jonathan Chaplin's book on Dooyeweerd, Dooyeweerd did use enkapsis to show how all societal organizations except the church are enkaptically founded on the state. In this way, he weakened Kuyper's idea of sphere sovereignty, which tried to separate

the state from all other institutions and organizations.¹² Because he does not understand individuality structures, Chaplin also fails to understand enkapsis (Friesen 2018a).

Modal aspects

Before we get into a detailed comparison of the philosophical anthropology of Haering and Dooyeweerd, we need to first look at Dooyeweerd's statement of these ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis. These ideas are in turn linked to the idea of the modal aspects of our experience. The aspects are given to our *experience* in the *cosmic order of time*. They are aspects of our experience, not properties of things or levels of being. And the aspects are ordered in time and not in a logical order.

Although many readers are familiar with the list of aspects of our experience, it is useful to remember that Dooyeweerd said that the idea of the modal aspects is one of *the least understood ideas* of his philosophy, and that the modal aspects are frequently understood in precisely the opposite way from what he intended (Dooyeweerd 1964, Discussion, pp. 2, 8).

I therefore repeat the list here, with the aspect that is “earliest”¹³ in our experience listed at the bottom of the list and building up from that foundation.

Faith (pistical)
Ethics (moral)
Law (juridical)
Beautiful harmony (aesthetic)
Economics (economic valuation)
Social (association)
Language (lingual)
History (development in time)
Logic (analysis)
Feeling (psychical)
Life (biological)
Movement (kinematic)
Physical
Space (spatial)
Number (numerical)

Haering refers to “specialties” or “particularities” of individuality that bear a striking resemblance to Dooyeweerd's modal aspects.¹⁴ Following Emil Lask, Haering refers to numerous areas [*Gebieten*] of science, like biology or psychology.¹⁵ Haering distinguishes between individuality in the sense of unique entities, and individuality in the sense of various specialties [*Besonderheiten*] of individuality. These specialties are not themselves individualities, but rather

¹² Dooyeweerd did not support a totalitarian state. However, there is an unfortunate reference to the Jewish view of the state, which Dooyeweerd says his philosophy “has struck a blow to the heart of the heathen and Jewish-nationalistic over-estimation of the moral worth of community in our temporal society” [“Bedrijfsorganisatie en Natuurlijke Gemeenschap,” in *Vernieuwing en Bezinning*]. See also Friesen 2018b re the use of reformational philosophy to support right-wing politics.

¹³ By “earliest,” Dooyeweerd means earliest in the order of time, and not earlier in the sense of logical priority. Again, this is a mistake made by most reformational philosophers, who do not accept Dooyeweerd's view of time.

¹⁴ Dooyeweerd also refers to a “modal specialty of meaning” that refers to a totality of meaning (*NC I*, 8) and *WdWI*, 63: *zin-bijzonderheid* as opposed to *zin-totaliteit*).

¹⁵ Haering 1926, 22, 44, 80. As Dooyeweerd would later do, Haering also refers to *analogies* between these various domains (Haering 1926, 23, 42, 74, 82).

particular variables of individuality. Haering says that these various specialties of individuality are ordered in a hierarchical way to each other [*untergeordnet*] so that each succeeding meaning presupposes the earlier. And yet the earlier is not causally dependent on the later, nor is it logically dependent (Haering 1926, 5, 8-9). In an earlier work, Haering refers to them as “factors,” which is how Baader referred to them (Haering 1921, 61).¹⁶

For Haering, numerical individuality is different from spatial individuality, and so forth. The specialties include the numerical, the spatial, the qualitative (colour, size), the dynamic (energetic), the biological, the psychical, and the “spiritual” [*geistliche*]¹⁷ areas of the ethical, the aesthetic, the economic, and the juridical (Haering 1926, 6-25). In his 1926 book about enkapsis, of which Dooyeweerd was clearly aware, Haering speaks of a “multi-level enkaptic” [*geschichtete enkaptische*] unity of relatively independent unities” (pp. 57, 75).

Haering also accepts Emil Lask’s view that the contents of our consciousness are “fragments of meaning” that require a “coherence of meaning” that shows itself as constitutive parts of each unitary selfhood. Haering refers to a “coherence of sense and meaning [*Sinn- und Bedeutungszusammenhangs*] that is independent from the individual. Our relation to it and its fulfilment is what makes our perception of other humans comprehensible (Haering 1926, 80, 97). This is close to the idea of aspects as aspects of our experience. Dooyeweerd uses the same

¹⁶ Haering divides the factors into psychical and physical, and within the physical he divides between the inorganic (chemical and physical) and the organic or physiological. Haering refers to kinds of psychical factors as “moments” within the historical *Gegenstand* of thought (p. 63). Baader also refers to modes of experience as “factors” (Friesen 2003).

¹⁷ Dooyeweerd also refers to the normative aspects of our experience as spiritual [*geestelijk*]. In 1931, Dooyeweerd refers to the modal aspects as sides of meaning [*zinzijden*], both natural as well as spiritual [*zoowel natuurlijke als geestelijke*]. In later works, Dooyeweerd would refer to the normative modalities as the so-called spiritual modalities, or put the word “*geestelijk*” in quotation marks (*WdW* I, vi; *NC* I, v). But he would continue to refer to the non-normative modal aspects as “natural sides” of meaning. See *WdW* I, 63, 65, 79. He distinguishes these natural meaning-sides [*natuur-zijden*] from the logical and the post-logical sides of reality. Dooyeweerd 2023, 222 refers to the normative subject functions, “commonly called spiritual functions.” See also *De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, in het licht eener Calvinistische kosmologie en kennistheorie* (1931), 87) where he refers to the “natural as well as the spiritual” [*zoowel natuurlijke als geestelijke*]. And in *Encyclopedia of Legal Sciences* (1946), Dooyeweerd says,

For full temporal reality, which I experience in everyday life, is given to me as an inseparable coherence of all meaning-sides, both of the natural-sides (the mathematical, mechanical, biotic and psychical), as well as from the spiritual sides (the logical, historical, linguistic, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, moral and faith sides).

In *Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde 2* (1928) 21-124, Dooyeweerd says at p.61:

De “ontsluiting der anticipatiesferen,” als actieve “door-geestelijking” van de wetskringen, is een religieus thema in de Calvinistische levens- en wereldbeschouwing, een thema, dat zijn hoogste spanning verkrijgt door de onmetelijke kracht der in universeelen zin genomen allesbeheerschende praedestinatiedachte. Overall, in alle wetskringen moet de religieuze zin doordringen en den zin der wetsgedachte “voleindigen,” al wordt in deze zondige bedeeeling dit ideaal nimmer vervuld, tenzij dan door Christus!

[The “unfolding of the anticipatory spheres,” as an active “in-spiration” [lit. “spiritualizing-through”] of the law-spheres, is a religious theme in the Calvinistic life and worldview, a theme that reaches its highest tension through the immeasurable power of the all-ruling idea of predestination, taken in its universal meaning. Religious meaning must penetrate everywhere, in all law-spheres, and it must “complete” the meaning of the law-idea, although in this sinful dispensation this ideal is never fulfilled, except through Christ!

terminology of fragments and coherence of meaning in reference to the aspects of experience. I have shown how Dooyeweerd developed his idea of aspects of our experience, distinguishing this idea from Lask's idea of *Gebieten* using Baader's ideas (Friesen 2016).

Modal aspects are not levels of reality

Dooyeweerd opposed Nicolai Hartmann's theory of levels or spheres of *being* [*Schichtenlehre*] (*NC II*, 51 fn3, 59).¹⁸ Dooyeweerd emphasized that the aspects are not levels of being, but aspects of our experience.¹⁹ This is not just a matter of using different terminology. Dooyeweerd denies that any temporal created reality has being in itself. It exists only insofar as it participates in humanity, the root of creation. Even humans have no being in themselves, but only insofar as they participate in Christ, the new root of creation. This idea of "religious root" is fundamental for Dooyeweerd. And since it is "religious," the root is also beyond time. Everything in time is only a "relative unity."

Dooyeweerd uses the term "levels" in a different way: he uses it with respect to levels of our *experience*. He refers to these levels (1) God's eternity (2) the supratemporal state of the *aevum*, the realm of our selfhood as religious root (3) the temporal realm of modes of consciousness, of our body, of events, and of individual things (4) the merely intentional (i.e. non-ontical) reality of our theoretical thought (*NC II*, 552, 560).

Haering would later expressly adopt Nicolai Hartmann's *Schichtenlehre* (Haering 1957).²⁰ So does Haering's 1926 idea of specialties of individuality mean levels or particularities of being? I don't think so. These specialties are areas of our *theoretical* experience.²¹ Dooyeweerd also says that we only distinguish the aspects in theoretical thought. And Haering's ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis concern the functioning of entities *within these special Gebieten*. This idea of functioning of entities within the aspects of our experience is something that Dooyeweerd also agreed with. The *functions* of entities are not to be identified with the aspects in which they function (see below).

For Haering, the specialties are *conceptually* different ways of understanding individuality. Furthermore, when he comes to the spiritual [*geistlich*] particularities, he distinguishes between the functions of consciousness and the contents of consciousness. The contents of consciousness are "fragments of meaning" or "moments" that need to be related to a coherence of meaning

¹⁸ In discussing Hartmann, Dooyeweerd is curiously defensive, pointing out that Hartmann's work appeared after the publication of his own *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*. But this is not really fair. The idea of aspects was not original to Dooyeweerd. As early as 1923, Dooyeweerd used Emil Lask (Friesen 2016). And even if the aspects are not levels of reality, the individuality structures that function *in* those modal structures are "qualified" by different modal aspects, and have varying levels of complexity. In this sense, Dooyeweerd could have spoken of different *levels of complexity* attained by individuality structures. As will be discussed later, this might allow us to use Dooyeweerd in relation to ideas of emergent evolution. This may or may not require a change in Dooyeweerd's philosophy.

¹⁹ Klapwijk improperly refers to the aspects "universal modes of being" (Klapwijk 2012, 63). Geertsema correctly says that Klapwijk does not recognize the horizon of individual things as an independent presupposition of experience (Geeertsema 2011).

²⁰ Haering refers to Hartmann's levels of being: the inorganic (unliving), to the organic (living), psychical [*beseelte*] and spiritual [*geistige*]. We must apply various categories to these various areas of being [*Seinsgebieten*] (Haering 1957). And both Haering and Hartmann relied on Max Scheler's 1927 book *Man's Place in the Cosmos*.

²¹ And Haering is careful to say that Haering already said in theory depends on proper boundaries [*Abgrenzung*] of the specialties or "parts" [*Teileinheiten*] (Haering 1926, 77).

[*Sinnzusammenhang*], and need to be related to a unitary self [*einheitliche Ich*] (pp. 79, 80).²² The specialties of individuality are *modes of functioning* [*Funktionsweise*]. They are different meanings [*Bedeutungen*] of individuality. A numerical particularity is not the same as a spatial particularity. They are differentiated from totality [*Ganzheit*]. We need to show the relation between an active whole with many modes of functioning²³ in relation to its “parts” [*Teile*]

Haering also refers to how we relate to these particularities as levels of values [*Wertstufen*] in how we use the physiological and psychical for our purposes, ranking them in accordance with whether they function either as subject or as object (Haering 1926, 90). Dooyeweerd would also divide the aspects into a subject-side and an object-side. Different individuality structures then function as objects or subjects within the modal aspects.

Modal aspects are not properties of things

Most reformational philosophers, including Dirk Vollenhoven, Danie Strauss, Roy Clouser,²⁴ and Hendrik van Riessen view modal aspects as properties of things. According to them, we learn of the modal aspects by means of abstraction of properties from things.

But Dooyeweerd strongly opposed this view.²⁵ The idea that aspects can be derived from things goes back to Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* Book 2, Chapter 14, where Aristotle deals with properties, classes and common genus. Dooyeweerd expressly rejects any such view of aspects as kinds or as properties. Just as substance cannot be the *genus proximum* of its accidents, so reality cannot be the *genus proximum* of its modalities (NC II, 14). The rejection of properties is therefore related to Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the idea of substance.

The individuality structures cannot be deduced from the modal structures of the aspects, and the modal aspects can in no way be deduced from the individuality structures:

... the individuality-structures of concrete reality, which can in no way be deduced from the modal structures of the aspects, just as the modal structures of the aspects can in no way be deduced from the individuality-structures of concrete reality. There is a serious misunderstanding concerning this cardinal point even by some adherents of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, insofar as they are of the opinion that the modal structures can be discovered by an ever-continuing abstraction from the concrete experience of reality. (Dooyeweerd 12975, “Gegenstandsrelatie” 90).

And yet the idea of aspects as properties is stubbornly maintained by reformational philosophers who (improperly) claim that they are following Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Despite Dooyeweerd’s

²² Haering cites Lask: all judging and knowing is a classification of a fragment of meaning in an (experienced, given) coherence of meaning [*eines Einreihung eines Sinnfragments in einem (erlebten, gegebenen) Sinnzusammenhang*]. And all values [*Werten*] in a coherence of values [*Wertzusammenhang*] (Haering 1926, 99). The fragments of meaning are related to a psychical unity of consciousness, the unitary self [*einheitliche Ich*].

²³ “ein sich betätigenden Ganzen (mit mehreren “Funktionsweisen”)

²⁴ A letter from Roy Clouser to Dooyeweerd dated June 21, 1972 confirms that Dooyeweerd objected to the idea of modes of experience being referred to as “property-kinds.” This was after Clouser had substantially completed his dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania, and despite extensive discussions between Clouser and Dooyeweerd the year before (See Dooyeweerd Archives, Lade I, 2).

²⁵ Dooyeweerd describes modalities as “modes of intuition” [*schouwingswijzen*], although he had also used this term in the earlier 1922 paper on Kelsen. In 1923, Dooyeweerd specifically denies that modalities are qualities or properties of things. He says that the modality in which the concrete meaning is perceived is not the same as a quality [*eigenschap*] of this concrete meaning.

harsh criticism, Strauss continues to maintain his view of abstraction of properties.²⁶ As editor of Dooyeweerd's *Collected Works*, Strauss shamelessly sets out his own ideas as if they were Dooyeweerd's, even though he knows that Dooyeweerd expressly rejected these ideas. Strauss refers to the "universal modal meaning" of the aspects in the sense of a general property of things; this general property is then *specified* in different ways by various entities:

...different entities specify the universal modal meaning of the various aspects of reality in peculiar (i.e. typical) ways. (Dooyeweerd 2023, Introduction, xv).

It is the existence of type-laws that enables us to classify physical entities and place them in various categories. The typical nature of an entity specifies the modal meaning of the aspects in which it functions. (Dooyeweerd 2023, Introduction xvi).

Note first that Strauss speaks of "aspects of reality" and not "aspects of experience." To say that they are aspects of reality is something that Dooyeweerd denies—that would make them levels of reality as in Hartmann's *Schichtenlehre*. We will also see that Strauss's view of type-laws is an incorrect idea of individuality structures in that he sees only a law-side. Finally, what does he mean by the entities *specifying* the universal meaning of the aspects? He means that the modal meaning is determined by the type of entity.

Strauss gives an example of two entities—a state and a university—"specifying" or determining the modality of economics in different ways, in contrast to what he calls the "modal universality" of every aspect that embraces all possible entities functioning in that aspect. Strauss says that this "modal universal character" is discovered by abstraction from entities. But this idea of "modal universality"—as a *general property* that applies to all entities—was specifically denied by Dooyeweerd. In his discussion with Dooyeweerd, Strauss had used a different analogy of a visit between friends and an official visit from the police. Dooyeweerd

That the police in their official visit represent the authority of government, whereas friends in their visiting associate with each other on the basis of equality in a sympathetic

²⁶ Dooyeweerd strongly criticized Strauss's substitution of the intra-modal logical subject-object relation for the *Gegenstand*-relation. Dooyeweerd says that Strauss's view (a) leads to logicism, (b) threatens the irreducibility of the aspects, since what is intra-logical can only be analogies of the non-logical aspects, and not their nuclear meaning (c) leads to a genuine insoluble antinomy, since although Strauss cannot maintain irreducibility of the aspects, he still wants to affirm such irreducibility. This gives rise to an antinomy between the logical aspect and the other aspects (d) that the irreducibility of the aspects can be maintained only on the basis of the (supratemporal) religious root, the selfhood (which Strauss denies) (e) that Strauss's identification of the *Gegenstand*-relation with the logical subject-object relation reflects "the most current prejudices of modern epistemology" and (f) that Strauss's view of theory as an intra-modal logical subject-object relation blurs the distinction between naïve pre-theoretical experience and theoretical experience (Dooyeweerd 1975, "*Gegenstandsrelatie*").

For a time in the 2000's, I was a member of the online discussion group Thinknet, which discussed Dooyeweerd's philosophy. I left because of abusive remarks posted online, something I did not expect from "Christian" philosophers. But before I left, I responded to a challenge by Strauss to prove him wrong in his disagreements with Dooyeweerd. I posted a 74-page response (Friesen 2008), showing how Strauss not only misunderstood the *Gegenstand*-relation, but also many other of Dooyeweerd's central ideas. I also showed that internally, Strauss had made errors in even elementary logic. Strauss did not respond, except to try to change the subject. In His editing of Dooyeweerd's *Collected Works*, he makes one footnote reference to our discussion, dismissing it in terms that seem to show he has never really read it; nor does he refer to my article. But it is not my disagreement with Strauss that matters. What matters is that Dooyeweerd disagreed with him. Strauss's own contrary opinions should never appear in the *Collected Works*.

relationship plays no role at all in the *modal structure* of the juridical or the social aspects. The distinction is exclusively due to the *individuality-structures* of this concrete event. (Dooyeweerd 1975).

Dooyeweerd specifically rejects this idea of a “modal universal character” or general property that is discovered by theoretical abstraction from entities. Dooyeweerd says that he “fundamentally rejects” the idea that “the modal structures are only given to us in their supposed individualization within the individuality-structures of concrete things, event, social relations and so on, and that their *universal* modal character is only to be discovered by theoretical abstraction from out of these individuality-structures.”

For Dooyeweerd, aspects are not a general property of things. “The modal structures *lie at the foundation* of the individuality- structures, *and not the other way around*” (Dooyeweerd 1975).²⁷

Strauss is so sure that the aspects are universal modal structures that he contrasts his “realistic” idea of universals with what he sees as Dooyeweerd’s nominalism (Strauss 2009, 436). But Dooyeweerd rejects both nominalism and realism. He says with respect to an apple tree:

The apple tree in general is not an individual real thing; it is also not merely a name by which all possible individual apple trees may be understood together, and even less is it merely a concept which will acquire objective reality. It is in contrast a structural principle, that is grounded in the temporal world order, and determined by God’s creative will (Dooyeweerd 1986, 54, my translation).

The functioning of the apple tree is based on its internal functional structure. This functional structure is determined by the individual totality of the tree and not the other way around (NC III, 98). The individuality structure expresses itself in each of its aspects:

An apple tree is distinguished from a stone not because it functions in a different modal aspect, but because in whatever aspect it functions it shows a different individuality structure (Dooyeweerd 1986, 54).

The mistaken idea that aspects are properties abstracted from things is continued in the book *The Future of Creation Order*. The editors Gerrit Glas and Jeroen de Ridder say that the modal aspects are “general categories of properties” of things—that they are “kinds of properties” of things.

The term property is usually understood as referring to an instantiation of a more general category. When I say, “This car is black,” then black is a property of the car. It is an instantiation in this particular car of the general category of blackness. Analytic philosophers often refer to property instantiations as tropes and to properties as universals. Modes, or modal aspects, refer neither to property instantiations, nor to properties, but to the general categories or families of properties—more specifically, to kinds of properties.(Glas and De Ridder 2017, 10).

This kind of logical atomism of things and their properties is precisely what Heidenhain’s idea of individuality structures was intended to overcome.

Unlike Vollenhoven, Strauss and most other reformational philosophers, Dooyeweerd does not view the modal aspects as universals that require a particular. Objectivity is not the same as

²⁷ We can form general concepts (classes and kinds) of the way that things function within the modalities, but the modalities themselves are not to be seen in terms of such universality (*WdWI*, 43).

universally valid law-conformity (NC II, 370). This misunderstanding of law (and modal aspects) as universals is something that Dooyeweerd says causes him to regret having used the term “Philosophy of the Law-Idea.” Dooyeweerd says the modal aspects are among the least understood of his ideas. And, as in the case of the modal aspects, there is much work to be done for reformational philosophers to understand individuality structures:

It is not sufficient that you know the name and not the nature of the beast—the nature that is covered over [*gedekt*] by the name, the nature that carries the name. Therefore, I believe that there remains much to be done here. And the same thing goes for the theory of the individuality structures (Dooyeweerd 1964, Discussion, 3, my translation)

Modal Aspects are not the same as functions

Individuality structures and things function *within the modes* or aspects of our experience, but these functions of things are not the same as the modal aspects within which they function. This is a crucial distinction that is missed by most reformational philosophers.²⁸

For Dooyeweerd, each individuality structure functions within the aspects of our experience as either a subject or an object. I believe that Dooyeweerd obtained this idea primarily through Baader (Friesen 2003), but as already discussed, there are some similarities with what Haering says about subject-object relations.

Individuality structures

Dooyeweerd says that things are made of two or more individuality structures that are enkaptically intertwined. We will look at enkapsis in more detail. For now, what is important is that an individuality structure is not just a law that determines the nature of a structure. An individuality structure is the *entity itself*. The individual entity does have a law *side*, which gives its structure,. But it also has a subject side that allows it to function *within the modal aspects of our experience*.

Vollenhoven and many reformational philosophers following him, such as Van Riessen, did not accept Dooyeweerd’s idea of individuality structures. One of the criticisms leveled against Dooyeweerd was that this theory reduced individual reality to law. In the 1964 lecture, Dooyeweerd says that this is a mistake, since he has always emphasized that reality has both a law-side and a subject-side, and that corresponding to the central law-Idea there is also a central subject-Idea (Dooyeweerd 1964, Discussion, 14).

Henk Geertsema correctly says that for Dooyeweerd, individuality structures have both a law-side and a subject-side (Geertsema 2011). Yet Strauss, the editor of Dooyeweerd’s *Collected Works*, says that “individuality structures belong to the law-side of reality” (Dooyeweerd 2023, Introduction, ix). Indeed, Strauss says that in translating Dooyeweerd for the purpose of the *Collected Works*, he considered dropping the term “individuality structure” altogether. Fortunately, the translator, Willem Ouweneel, was allowed to translate the term correctly.

But Strauss still gives a long footnote to the *Collected Works*, where he disputes the term “individuality structure,” and proposes different language, whether that of Van Riessen’s term “identity structure,” Hendrik Hart’s term “functor,” Magnus Verbrugge’s term “idionomy,”²⁹ Roy

²⁸ Strauss incorrectly says that the terms “modal aspect” and “function” are synonymous (Strauss 2009, 363).

²⁹ Dooyeweerd specifically rejected the term “idionomy” as a proper term for individuality structures. It was suggested to him that his students had problems in understanding this new term in his philosophy, which was already difficult enough. They suggested that “individuality structure” be replaced by the word ‘idionomy’ (from the Greek words

Clouser's term "type-law" or Strauss's own term "entity structure" (Introduction to Dooyeweerd 2023, ix-x). All of this is very misleading. In my view, it is an abuse of Strauss's position as general editor of the *Collected Works* to interpose his own ideas in this way, and to mis-state that individuality structures have only a law-side. It shows a disregard for the history of philosophy in favour of an attempt to systematize philosophy. One must first understand Dooyeweerd correctly before one can critique his ideas. This is especially important in *Collected Works* that are supposed to show the correct text! Strauss's notes and introduction to the text must be used with great caution if we really want to understand Dooyeweerd. To see entities as separate from their individuality structure leads to the error of seeing the modal aspects as abstractions from those entities—as properties of those entities.

The incorrect view of individuality structures as having only a law side was one of the reasons that Dooyeweerd expressed misgivings about the name 'Philosophy of the Law-Idea' [*Wetsidee*] for his philosophy (Discussion, p. 14). Dooyeweerd says that his philosophy was criticized for being unable to give an account of individual reality, which can never be reduced to law.³⁰

Individuality structures are therefore *entities*. They are not merely laws that apply to entities. The individuality structures are the entities themselves! Strauss says that this is a "confusion" in Dooyeweerd, but the confusion is in Strauss and others who fail to recognize what Dooyeweerd says about the subject-side within the individuality structure.³¹

Dooyeweerd devotes a great deal of time showing how the subject-side of individuality structures works within time, which is their "bottom layer" (Friesen 2005). The law-side gives *structure*, and the subject-side gives *duration* of the entire individuality structure. This is similar to Haering's distinction between the "horizontal" structure and the "vertical structure" of enkaptic wholes.

Haering emphasizes the importance of time in the formation of enkaptic entities. For Haering, this involves different tempos and rhythms. By "rhythm," Haering means that the individual, even if it appears the same, changes in different times. This is the "vertical" dimension of enkapsis, where things become, change and develop in time, as opposed to the "horizontal" structural enkapsis of entities.³² The "parts" build on each other in different rhythms, some later and some earlier (Haering 1926, 48-49). By "rhythm," he means that the individual, even if it appears the same, changes at different times (p. 49). This is the "vertical" dimension of enkapsis where things become, change and develop in time, as opposed to the "horizontal" structural enkapsis (p. 32). Each thing has its own "Eigengesetzliche Rhythmus"—rhythm that is set for it by law. And this rhythm is set and grounded in the thing itself, in its own laws of development. Change is not just

idios: peculiar or special, and *nomos*: law). In other words, an individuality structure would be a particular law for an individual thing. Dooyeweerd did not agree with this proposal. Steen reports this from a conversation with Magnus Verbrugge, who learned it from P.A. Verburg.

³⁰ He refers to Hendrik Stoker, who said that the philosophy was an absolutization of the law, an attempt to reduce factuality to the law. According to Stoker, factuality could only be explained from out of the Logos. Vincent Brümmer also alleged that the Philosophy of the Law-Idea could not arrive at giving an account of reality, but that it ran the danger of becoming stranded in a law idealism.

³¹ See Strauss (Dooyeweerd 2023, 27 fn2).

³² There is a horizontal pull towards unity [*Einheitszug*] that encloses the simultaneous "parts" in each moment (the "whole" with its "parts") as well as a vertical drive as it changes in time. Note his use of "moments," something that Dooyeweerd also uses: a structure is an architectonic plan according to which a diversity of "moments" is united in a totality. The idea of "moments" cannot be understood by those who, like Vollenhoven, reject Dooyeweerd's view of cosmic time as placing the aspects in a succession of temporal moments.

due to environment or external circumstances. Even chemical elements, like radium, have a certain lifespan and rhythm in which they decay and are used up. The vertical is also shown in later differentiated stages of development (p. 76).

Individuality structures exist in cosmic time

Despite Dooyeweerd's emphasis on the key importance of cosmic time and of the supratemporal selfhood, most reformational philosophers have also rejected these ideas. Recent discussions of Dooyeweerd ignore his ideas of time. The editors of *The Future of Creation Order* purport to give a summary of Dooyeweerd's philosophy in relation to creation order, but their only reference to cosmic time is in relation to van der Meer's assertion that cosmic time order is a form of "essentialism" (Glas and De Ridder 2017, Vol I, p. 21). They say that Dooyeweerd's transcendental framework is "for specialists" and has "no immediate bearing on the discussion about absolutization and reification" (p. 24). Dooyeweerd would strongly disagree. The whole purpose of his *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* is to give a transcendental critique, aimed at showing the necessity of a *temporal* order of coherence of the modal aspects, a *supratemporal* concentration point, and an *eternal Arché* or Origin. His ideas of the improper absolutization of temporal aspects cannot be understood apart from that transcendental critique and its underlying ideas of time, supratemporality and eternity.

Unlike what is claimed for substances, an individuality structure does not exist except within time. Thus, Dooyeweerd's objection to Aristotle's idea of substance is not only that substance is uncreated. Dooyeweerd is not just substituting a created substance! For Dooyeweerd, even in time, there is no being in itself. Dooyeweerd says that things only exist in their supratemporal root.³³

Dooyeweerd believes that time itself was created,³⁴ and that humans were initially created as above time, or supra-temporal. After the fall, God's law set or placed his creation within time. Dooyeweerd obtained his ideas of cosmic time, supra-temporality and eternity, as well as this idea of being placed by the law [*gesetzt* by the *Gesetz*] from Franz von Baader's Christian theosophy (Friesen 2003; 2015). Dooyeweerd's entire idea of creation depends on Baader's theosophical ideas of time and creation.

Haering does not have as developed an idea of time and supratemporality as does Baader.³⁵ However, as we have seen, Haering also emphasizes the importance of time in the formation of enkaptic entities. For Haering, this involves different *tempos* and rhythms. Each of the "parts" builds on each other in different rhythms, some later and some earlier (Haering 1926, 48-49). Dooyeweerd uses this idea of temporal earlier and later in his discussion of the order of the modal

³³ Baader says that in the temporal region, there is no being, just a becoming and annihilation [*entwerden*] (*Werke* 2, 114). For a discussion of how Dooyeweerd's rejection of substance goes beyond the mere objection to uncreated reality, see my discussion in Friesen 2005b.

³⁴ These ideas of creation of time and how humans were set within time will be discussed in my article on emergent evolution. Hinduism and Zoroastrianism have their own doctrines of the creation of time.

³⁵ Haering does not mention Baader, but there are common mystical or theosophical traditions, and many ideas in common. Haering must have been aware of Baader, since he refers to the *Herdflamme* series of books which included a volume on Baader. Haering relies on ideas of Novalis and the theosophical tradition of Boehme. Haering would later write a book on Novalis as Philosopher (*Novalis als Philosoph*, 1959). Novalis was influenced by Boehme, and Novalis interacted with the ideas of Baader. Haering advocated the entire German philosophical tradition in contrast to the rationalistic ideas from other cultures. This emphasis led to his acceptance of the ideas of National Socialism.

aspects. Haering refers to Bergson's ideas on time as well as the ideas of "German idealists" whom he does not specify.

Enkapsis

Referring to Martin Heidenhain, Rieppel describes enkapsis as:

An enkaptic (nested) hierarchy is, in brief, a nested hierarchy of complex wholes with emergent properties at all levels of inclusiveness. The complex wholes that make up such a hierarchy are spatiotemporally located, functionally integrated relational systems—that is, individuals of different levels of complexity. The dynamic, indeed processual systems, or individuals, that make up the enkaptic hierarchy are subject to upwards as well as downwards causation" (Rieppel 2017, 185)

For Dooyeweerd, a *thing*, or an enkaptic whole, is made up of two or more *individuality structures* that are encapsulated or nested (encapsulated or enclosed) within one another. "Enkapsis" means "encapsulation."³⁶ In enkapsis, the more inclusive structure encloses (or encapsulates) a less inclusive structure.

This is somewhat like nested Russian dolls, except that each doll has a different individuality structure. It is also similar to Ken Wilber's idea of nested *holons*, or "the Great Nest of Being":

Reality is a rich tapestry of interwoven levels, reaching from matter to body to mind to soul to spirit. Each senior level envelops or enfolds its junior dimensions—a series of nests within nests within nests of Being—so that every thing and event in the world is interwoven with every other, and all are ultimately enveloped and enfolded by Spirit, by God, by Goddess, by Tao, by Brahman, by the Absolute itself (Wilber 1998, 2).

Wilber views these holons in terms of separate things nested within each other, and does not distinguish between different individuality structures in the detailed way that Dooyeweerd does (Friesen 2010).³⁷

The detail that Dooyeweerd gives is related to his idea of individuality structures, and the way that each structure is qualified differently, depending on what its highest subject function is in the temporal order of aspects. In the nesting or encapsulation, the *leading function* of one individuality structure is the *founding function* of the next. The enclosing structure is *qualified* by its own leading function, and is based on its own founding function. But that founding function is in turn the leading function of the included or enclosed structure.³⁸

³⁶ Haering says that enkapsis means "*Einkapselung*," enclosure, encasement. It is a nesting, [ineinanderschachteln] ("*schachtel*" means "box"). (Haering 1926, 46).

³⁷ Wilber obtained the term "holon" from Arthur Koestler. The term "holism" seems to have been coined by Jan Smuts (1870–1950) in his 1926 book *Holism and Evolution*. Smuts used it to refer to a "process-orientated, hierarchical view of nature." However, the idea of organicism, which is also opposed to reductionism, is much older than the term "holism." Organicism includes the idea of a "body and its limbs" that we find in Baader and Kuyper. The idea of Totality or *Ganzheit* is also much older than the term "holism."

³⁸ Most reformational philosophers, including Vollenhoven, reject the ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis. And because they do not recognize the nested nature of individuality structures, these reformational philosophers misunderstand the idea of a "leading" and "founding" function. They view things in a simplistic way as qualified by the physical, biotic or psychical structures. But we hardly need a complicated philosophy like Dooyeweerd's in order to distinguish mineral, vegetable and animal. Dooyeweerd's idea of individuality structures is much richer than that.

This can get very complicated indeed. Dooyeweerd gives the example of the sculpture of Praxiteles. It has many nested individuality structures. The work of the artist's productive imagination encloses the historically formed marble (it is a cultural product, with a leading historical function), which encloses the natural marble (with its leading physical function), which encloses the individuality structures of its atoms (Friesen 2015, 357-58).

Each level of encapsulation gives rise to a new entity that is not just the sum of the enclosed entities but is something new. Thus, it is not a case of a thing being the sum of its parts. And each of the enclosed individuality structures retains its own characteristics within the totality of the whole enkaptic structure (Friesen 2015, 353-61).

Dooyeweerd's unfair critique of Haering's idea of enkapsis

Max Wundt criticized Haering's use of "enkapsis" as being merely an outer connection of parts, insufficiently showing how the "parts" of each totality were not just members of the totality, but were *ordered by* and *ruled by* the totality, and how the parts were interlaced with it and with each other.

Wundt's article was in Felix Krueger's 1932 book, which was in Dooyeweerd's library, and it is evident that Dooyeweerd used Wundt's critique (without acknowledgement). Wundt and Dooyeweerd says that Haering uses the term "enkapsis" without seeing the manifold interwovenness of the members and the whole ["greifen mannigfach in und -übereinander"]. and without pointing out the ruling or "leading" function in the structure (Wundt 1932, 15; Dooyeweerd NC III, 636).

Dooyeweerd takes from Wundt not only his critique of Haering's use of "enkapsis," but the very term "individuality structure." Both terms are used by Wundt in this article, which was in the 1932 Krüger book in Dooyeweerd's library. But Dooyeweerd never mentions Max Wundt.³⁹ Nor does he acknowledge Wundt's contribution of the idea of individuality structures, or how Wundt used the terms to differentiate the structure of things from the idea of substance. The rejection of the idea of substance would be one of Dooyeweerd's main arguments for the idea of individuality structures (NC III, 60).

Already in 1921, Haering spoke of the "individual structure" of the related totality [*individualstruktur des betreffenden Ganzen*] (Haering 1921, 197).

Second, it is just not true that Haering interpreted enkapsis in terms of the part and the whole. Haering puts the terms "part" [*Teil*] and "whole" [*Ganzes*] in scare quotes. He says that enkapsis is a special kind of unity; it is *not* one that can simply be put together from parts; it is *not* just an aggregate or sum of its parts [*Teilbestandteile, ein Nebeneinander*] Rather, these "parts" [*Teilelemente*] are enclosed together in an inner way with each other, thereby making a totality [*miteinander und dadurch zum Ganzen zusammengeschlossen*] (pp. 19, 20). Without the whole, the parts are different. There is something new, not just sum of parts. It is a qualitatively new unity (47). He says that the "parts" [*Teileinheiten*] would not be what they are, without the total unity [*Gesamteinheit*]; on the other hand, the totality cannot be without the parts, although it is more

³⁹ Dooyeweerd only mentions Wundt's father in relation to psychology. Perhaps Dooyeweerd did not mention Wundt because of Wundt's association with National Socialism. But Haering would later also be an advocate of National Socialism, and this did not prevent Dooyeweerd from mentioning him.

than just sum of their parts. Both are important (p. 75). Without relation to and within the totality, no “parts” can be understood (p. 84).

Third, Dooyeweerd uses Wundt’s rejection of teleology or entelechy. Wundt says that Haering’s relation of a thing to totality [its *Ganzheitsbeziehung*] does not coincide with its relation to goals, [its *Zweckbeziehung*], but is much richer. It is true that Haering has ideas of entelechy (see discussion of “leading” below). But it is a rich idea of entelechy, led by Spirit, which acts in the psychical and the physical. The psychical individuality is not what individuality was in the physical atom, but is rather a “living fullness of purposes” [*Bestimmungen*]. Dooyeweerd says that the idea of *entelechy* comes from Aristotle and is based on the idea of substance (Dooyeweerd 1996, 7).⁴⁰ But as we shall see when we discuss emergent evolution, some idea of entelechy is required even if we deny substance. Dooyeweerd’s ideas of “leading” and of “anticipation” are themselves examples of entelechy.

Fourth, is it really the case that Haering did not acknowledge the leading nature of the whole within the individuality structure? No. Haering actually uses the term “leading” to describe the way lower structures are incorporated by enkapsis into the encompassing structure.

Haering says that there is a unitary dynamically active force that causes development in the enkaptic relationship, and that this force pervades [*durchwaltet*] the enkaptic whole in a way that it can be said to be led [*geleitet*]. Haering says that this term “leading” is an anthropomorphic way of referring to this guiding force (p. 21).

This idea of *leading* within the enkaptic whole is especially seen in Haering’s idea of enkapsis as used in philosophical anthropology. Haering says that the spiritual [*geistlich*] functions lead [*leiten*] the physiological and the psychical functions for its purposes (p. 89). It is a goal-directed intervention [*ein zielhaft-bewusste Eingreifung*]. The merely psycho-physical individual (body and soul) consciously and apperceptively enters into service of the higher functions of spirit (p. 90). Human individuality is a teleological unity led [*geleitet*] and formed [*gestaltet*] by conscious rational will (p. 96).

Misunderstandings of enkapsis

Problems and misinterpretations arise when reformational philosophers attempt to use the idea of enkapsis without the underlying idea of individuality structures. They then misinterpret enkapsis as merely an intertwinement of separate things or structures. This leads to misinterpretations like those of Andrew Basden, who uses “enkapsis” in the sense of systems analysis, or the mistaken societal analysis of Jonathan Chaplin. By viewing enkapsis as merely a mutual interlacement or interrelationship of societal organizations, Chaplin misses Dooyeweerd’s emphasis that all societal organizations other than the church are founded on the state in an enkaptic relation. For Dooyeweerd, the only differentiated organized communities of an institutional nature⁴¹ are the

⁴⁰ This objection is not logical. Just because substance implies entelechy does not mean that entelechy implies substance. One may have entelechy without the idea of substance, in the sense of goals that need to be fulfilled. Indeed, as will be argued later, Dooyeweerd’s idea of anticipation and of fulfillment is itself a kind of entelechy. It would be better to acknowledge, like Max Wundt, that there is entelechy, but that enkapsis is “much richer.”

⁴¹ *The only differentiated organized communities of an institutional nature are the church and the state* (NC III, 379). Chaplin’s characterization of sphere sovereignty as “normative institutional pluralism” is therefore also incorrect, since only the church and the state are institutions (Chaplin, 14).

church and the state (NC III, 379).⁴² If this is so, it is incorrect to refer to schools or businesses as institutions.

Dooyeweerd's ideas appear to be a substantial revision from Kuyper's vision of sphere sovereignty, where different institutions correspond to each of the various spheres of life [*levenskringen*]. For Dooyeweerd, the state has priority over all differentiated voluntary associations because they rely on this private law (NC III, 572). Private law is bound by and included in the more embracing law of the state. There is a one-sided foundational enkapsis between the differentiated institutions of church and state and these non-political associations. Free associations presuppose the rise of a common private law; they depend on either contractual relations or on constitutional arrangements of the community (NC III, 657-70).

This means that the state has much more involvement in these other organizations than in Abraham Kuyper's idea of sphere sovereignty. Dooyeweerd is actually relativizing the principle of sphere sovereignty by means of this idea of enkapsis! (Friesen 2018a).

Dooyeweerd's Philosophical Anthropology

Dooyeweerd says that philosophical anthropology stands at the beginning and at the end of philosophical reflection (Dooyeweerd 2023, 134). His views of individuality structures and enkapsis are essential to understanding his philosophical anthropology. As we have noted, individuality structures exist in time. But temporal things are perishable, they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal individual whole, i.e. of a relative unity in a multiplicity of functions. (NC III, 65).

Dooyeweerd denies that things can ever exist independently of humans. Temporal reality has no existence or reality at all except in humanity as the religious root of temporal reality. There is no temporal reality "an sich" (NC I, vi). "Neutrality" does not just refer to the mistaken belief that there are no religious presuppositions, but to the mistaken view that there is a world that exists separately from humans. There is a complete relativity and lack of self-sufficiency of all that exists in the created mode of meaning (NC I, 123). "Not a single temporal structure of meaning exists in itself (an sich)" (NC II, 30). The metaphysical conception of a natural reality in itself, independent of humans, is un-biblical (NC II, 52).

Even our selfhood, as the religious root and fullness of individuality is not a substance, but also exists only as meaning, in relation to God its Origin (NC I, 4).

Humans are comprised four individuality structures in time, and one center or selfhood outside of time that *expresses* itself in all four of these temporal structures. These four enkaptic structures with a supratemporal center are set out in Dooyeweerd's "32 Propositions on Man" and in his draft

⁴² I have argued that even this distinction is too simplistic. Insofar as a religious institution operates a school that discriminates against certain people, or requires a division of matrimonial property in a way that differs from the surrounding society, the state must intervene to protect human rights. And that is how Canadian law seems to be interpreting the relation of church and state (Friesen 2018b).

ideas on anthropology in Dooyeweerd 2023.⁴³ All four of these individuality structures are already found in Haering's views on enkapsis.⁴⁴

The first three individuality structures are what have been traditionally referred to as the differing structures of minerals, plants and animals.

1. The physical individuality structure. This first structure is qualified in a physico-chemical way. At death, it becomes free of its interwovenness with later structures, and its own typical lawfulness manifests itself. The body then disintegrates in the process of corruption (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XIII).

2. The biotic or "vegetative" individuality structure. Dooyeweerd says that this is where living cells and other biologically qualified combinations make their appearance. It includes the autonomic (vegetative) nervous system, the muscle tissues, bone tissue and glands (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XIII)

3. The psychic individuality structure governs the psychical functions of the central nervous system; the senses, brain, spinal cord and glandular system and the muscle tissues. Dooyeweerd says that most of these functions are outside of the control of human volition (Dooyeweerd 1942, Prop XIII).

4. The act-structure, the structure of human acts of knowing, imagining and willing. Reformational philosophers have not paid enough attention to this individuality structure.

a) *The act-structure is our full human body*

Without the act-structure, the three lower enkaptic structures do not become real parts of the enkaptic structural whole called the 'human body' (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XI)

b) *The act-structure is our person or personality*

Dooyeweerd says this act-structure is our "personality," our "I" in distinction from our supratemporal selfhood. This distinction between our "I" and our selfhood allows for dialogue with others who make the ego/self distinction, like C.G. Jung.⁴⁵ Dooyeweerd emphasizes that this act-structure or "I" is a real enkaptic structure: The act-structure is an individuality structure. It is a typical structure of expression for the human spirit (Dooyeweerd 2023, 181).

c) *The act-structure is where our acts, which proceed from out of our supratemporal selfhood, are expressed in time*

⁴³ I am using his 1942 article, as supplemented by Willem Ouweneel using Dooyeweerd's draft writings now published in his *Collected Works* (Dooyeweerd 2023). A word of warning here: While Dooyeweerd's draft is useful, the notes and introduction by the editor Danie Strauss should be used with caution, since they frequently refer to Strauss's own views that were decisively rejected by Dooyeweerd.

⁴⁴ Haering refers (Haering 1926, 25) to inorganic (chemical-physical), organic-biological and spiritual domains [*geistlicher Gebiete*]. At p. 67, he differentiates the human from biological, animal and plant organisms. P. 74 the soul has a functional unity, even without regard to the more encompassing incorporation [*Eingliederung*] in the psycho-physical or the spiritual (psycho-physical-spiritual). Psychology includes the components of sensations, *Vorstellungen*, feelings, intentional contents and *Gegenstände* (p. 74). The individual psyche as an enkaptic unity (p. 75).

⁴⁵ Scheler calls the spiritual center a "person," in contrast to the "I" that is bound to the psycho-vital sphere (Dooyeweerd 2023, 150).

All human acts *proceed from* out of our supratemporal selfhood, but are *expressed in* time. This expression of our selfhood is in the fourth enkaptic structure, the act-structure, our “I.” In other words, our supratemporal selfhood expresses itself in a temporal “I” or ego. No other bearer of temporal reality can express itself in this way in the world. or in the world of imagination, under guidance of normative points of view. We internalize these intentional states of affairs by relating them back to our I-ness. Their “innerness” is involved in their intentional character (Dooyeweerd 2023, 148).

In many ways, the differentiation that Dooyeweerd makes between the third psychical and the fourth act-structure is similar to that between brain and what other philosophers call “Mind.” The brain is not the source of these acts. Their source is our spiritual center of our whole being; it is the entire person and not merely the soul that thinks, will, imagines or judges (Dooyeweerd 2023, 152).

The term “act structure” was used by Max Scheler, from whom Dooyeweerd obtained many of his ideas.⁴⁶ Scheler also refers to our selfhood, outside of time, expressing itself in this act structure in time.

d) No animal has this act structure

Scheler says that no animal has this act structure. Animals have an ecstatic existence; there is a total lack of animals to “report” organic conditions back to a center. Dooyeweerd agrees; animals are ex-statically absorbed by their temporal existence (*NC II*, 480; Dooyeweerd 2023, 113). This idea about animals ultimately derives from Baader.

Dooyeweerd follows these ideas in his assertion that animals have no spiritual act-center; the animal body is limited to the psychically qualified structure (Dooyeweerd 1942, Propositions XXII and XXIII). There is no act-structure in the animal body; their knowing, desiring and imagining is always qualified by the sensitive aspect; their knowledge is never in opposition to or fundamentally distinct from the sensitive function.⁴⁷ Animals cannot have experiences [*Erlebnisse*]. Experience belongs to the typical *human* act-structure. Animal sensations are different from human sensations; they not controlled by higher functions like logical. They are merely emotional; being sensitively “moved” (psychical analogy of motion) (Dooyeweerd 2023, 108). Animals do not have the ability to participate in the normative aspects. Max Scheler sees the boundary between plants and animals in sensation [*Empfindung*]. For Scheler, like Bernhard Bavink, the boundary of what is psychical coincides with boundaries of life itself: the organic-biotic is merely the external, objectively perceptible and material manifestation of an inner “experiential sensitive center” which Scheler views as “soul”—psycho-vitalistic conception of life (Dooyeweerd 2023, 111).

Dooyeweerd says that the normative is where Scheler “draws the line” between humans and animals, but surely that is where Dooyeweerd does, too. Both Scheler and Dooyeweerd says that the animal is limited by its environment [*Umwelt*] and cannot objectify that environment. We will look at the meaning of “objectify” later. Animals have what Scheler calls “cunning” but they remain bound to their immediate life environment.

⁴⁶ It should be noted that Scheler was in turn influenced by Baader (Friesen 2003).

⁴⁷ In the theoretical *Gegenstand*-relation, emotions are restricted; the impression arises that they are eliminated (Dooyeweerd 2023, 108).

The aspects in which only the human selfhood can express itself are the normative or “spiritual” [*geestelijk*] aspects. That does not mean that humans do not express themselves in the other aspects, too. Human acts are expressed in the physical, biotic and psychical as well. But all normative subject functions depend on *human* activity for their actualization (Dooyeweerd 2023, 246). Haering distinguishes between natural psychical and the spiritual [*geistige*] functions like conscious judgment and comparison (Haering 1926, 78) whereas Dooyeweerd places judgment as among the acts proceeding from our supratemporal selfhood or spirit.

e) At death, the selfhood lays down the fourth enkaptic structure

At death the entire enkaptic structure of the human body (including the fourth structure, the “I”), disintegrates. The physio-chemical structure (the first enkaptic structure) “frees itself and becomes a corpse (Dooyeweerd 2023, 171-73). For Dooyeweerd, the body is bound in a one-sided dependence on our supratemporal selfhood. When this binding is broken up, the death of the body will occur (Dooyeweerd 2023, 170).

Scripture....discloses to us the *supratemporal religious root*, the *integral* center of temporal human existence. The temporal acts of thinking and willing are merely *temporal branches*, *temporal expressions* of this supratemporal religious root (Proposition IV).

5. The Supratemporal Self

a) The Selfhood exists above time

In his philosophical anthropology, Dooyeweerd refers many times to our supratemporal selfhood. In this idea of supratemporality of the selfhood, Dooyeweerd incorporates Baader’s ideas on time, supratemporality [*überzeitlichkeit*] and eternity. I have written numerous articles showing how Dooyeweerd obtained these ideas from Baader. This was through his own reading of Baader, through Abraham Kuyper, and through J.H. Gunning, Jr. (the theologian who introduced Baader’s idea of *überzeitlichkeit* to Kuyper and to Dutch Reformed thought, as well as through other writers like Okke Norel.⁴⁸

Our selfhood is not just a collection of temporal functions. Contrary to Vollenhoven,⁴⁹ Dooyeweerd says that the selfhood is not just a complex of temporal functions centered in the “heart.” If the selfhood were just a unity within temporal diversity, or a part of unity, it could never lay down the body nor continue the existence of a person beyond the grave. The soul is a spiritual unity beyond temporal diversity (Dooyeweerd 2023, 126, 141).

As we have already seen, Haering speaks of time in relation to individuality structures. He also sees spirit as transcending time. Haering distinguishes the human spirit from a purely “natural” animal individuality⁵⁰ because spirit cannot be understood spatially or temporally or qualitatively. For Haering, this spirit is what we mean by personality and it is “the last and highest *principium*

⁴⁸ The theologian George Haerincx has said that Kuyper did not rely on Baader to any significant extent. Has Haerincx really read Kuyper’s enthusiastic reception of Baader’s ideas? (Friesen 2003b), Kuyper also said that sphere sovereignty derived from Groen van Prinsterer; even there, the ideas was not original to Groen van Prinsterer but derives from Baader (Friesen 2018c). And Haerincx has not taken account of the research by Lieuwe Mietus on J.H. Gunning’s influence on Kuyper, and the introduction of Baader’s ideas to Kuyper (Friesen 2007).

⁴⁹ Vollenhoven believed that the selfhood was merely the concentration point of temporal functions, and that this selfhood dissolved at death.

⁵⁰ Baader would not use “natural” in this way, since for him, even God has a nature, and so does our supratemporal selfhood.

individuationis,” the highest fulfilment of the idea of individuality. Spirit is where deeds are seen as “one’s own work” [*eigenes Werk*] and where we distinguish our experience from that of others (pp. 94-96).⁵¹

b) *The Selfhood is the source of our actions*

The selfhood is the source of our actions of *willing, knowing, and acting*. These actions are always *expressed* in the temporal act-structure. The supratemporal selfhood cannot act without such temporal expression: the human spirit cannot carry out any real acts outside its temporal corporal individuality structure. It is the individual human being in integrity of body and soul who accomplishes the acts (Dooyeweerd 2023, 162).⁵² We should not speak of actions by the spirit alone or by the body alone:

All human acts have their origin in the soul as the *spiritual center* of man’s existence. With respect to their temporal structure, however, they can only take place *in* the human body. It would be incorrect, therefore, to say that the soul or spirit thinks, imagines or wills, just as it would be incorrect to say that the body thinks, imagines or wills. The *whole man as an integral unity of soul and body* performs these acts. Outside of the body no acts are possible. In other words, acts should be thought of as neither purely spiritual, nor as purely bodily (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XX).⁵³

The total human body is always in action with all its aspects in every act of knowing, imagining or willing (Proposition XVIII). The body is the “field of expression” of the human spirit (Proposition XXII).

Dooyeweerd says that our acts include knowing, willing and imagining (NC III, 88). This comes from Baader, who said that our willing, thinking and acting come from our root being. So does our imagination and understanding (*Werke* 5, 82; 8, 252;). Haering also says that our intentional acting and willing come from our unitary selfhood. It is this selfhood that allows us to see our actions as our “own work” (Haering 1926, 75, 80, 94).

c) *The Selfhood is the center of consciousness*

Dooyeweerd distinguishes between our pre-theoretical or naïve experience, which he calls “cosmic consciousness,” with our theoretical experience or “cosmological consciousness.” Only cosmic consciousness grasps the deeper unity of the aspects, because the selfhood transcends all its modal

⁵¹ Cf. Dooyeweerd’s use of the term “our own.” *WdW* II, 408-410; *NC* II, 474.

⁵² One wonders how this idea fits with Christ’s resurrection body, which is said to have been able to act in time. Perhaps what Dooyeweerd means is that, without a body, the supratemporal selfhood cannot act. After death, it is given a new, spiritual body in which it can act. This still does not explain the manifestations of this new self/body within time. What are we to say of the appearances of Jesus after his death? He is said to have shown his body, and to have eaten food. Yet he also passed through walls. The theologian N.T. Wright sees this as evidence of what the new spiritual body will be like. Perhaps. Or we might say that these were visions that the disciples had after a traumatic event. Or we might say that the Christ beyond time was still able to “manifest” himself in temporal terms. That sounds like New Age ideas, but it is a possible response. Another response is that Dooyeweerd is inconsistent. Elsewhere he says that human acts are not merely spiritual: they are localized in the fourth individuality structure (Dooyeweerd 2023, 151). To say that they are not “merely” spiritual seems to suggest that they also occur outside of time and are not merely expressed in time.

⁵³ This is similar to Scheler’s view: the selfhood beyond time can act only within time.

functions) (NC I, 431, 479). In the root of self-consciousness, human experience transcends time itself (NC II, 472).

Our cosmological or theoretical consciousness is obtained in the *Gegenstand*-relation (discussed below)

d) *The subconscious or unconscious*

Within the temporal act structure, there is a subordination of the unconscious substratum to the conscious (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XXIV). Our act structure is concentrated on the spiritual center and in a hierarchical normative ordering of *conscious* life above the *unconscious* (Dooyeweerd 2023, 177). Our I-ness (the fourth enkaptic structure, the act-structure) has a depth layer in the unconscious, and this unconscious is both inborn and hereditary (Dooyeweerd 2023, 181-2). It might be helpful to distinguish (like C.G. Jung) between a personal unconscious that is temporal, and a collective unconscious that is both temporal (historical) as well as supratemporal.

Within the subconscious, the coherence of physio-chemical, biotic and post-biotic aspects in temporal human existence is much closer than in the conscious stratum (Dooyeweerd 2023, 178). Dooyeweerd gives the example of stigmata, where physical effects appear in the body.

Haering also speaks of the unconscious as an archaic stratum [*Bewusstseinszustände*] (Haering 2026, 111 fn33).

e) *Personality*

If the unconscious is the substratum of our act life, the superstratum of our temporal act-structure is our character or personality. The full religious individuality of a person expresses itself in the temporal existence of human beings in that which we call their “character.” The dispositions of our character find their source in the supratemporal heart (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XXVII).

Human character gives the fourth structure a typical temporal type (Dooyeweerd 2023, 169, 182). Dooyeweerd refers to different types of the human act-structure: characterology, tribe, sex, family, race (Proposition XXVI).

g) *Psychological pathology*

Psychological diseases are a result of disturbance in our act-structure. The acts of thinking, imagining and willing are no longer directed towards the spiritual center. There is a loss of coherence, of relation to our I-ness; patients speak about themselves in third person.

For instance, Dooyeweerd says that schizophrenia is a result of our act structure losing its structure of normative coordination and concentration. This happens when the subconscious loses its subordination to consciousness. Coherence is lost because thinking, willing and imagining are no longer directed to the spiritual center of the personality (Dooyeweerd 2023, 179). Our act-life loses its structure of normative coordination and concentration; functions of consciousness become simpler and fall apart. In cases of split personality, the patient sees her personality as in a “broken mirror.” Primitive symbols intrude from the unconscious: similar to symbols in cosmogonies of primitive peoples. There is a disorganization of the fourth individuality structure, a falling apart and simplification of the conscious functionality. An image of a split or double personality arises; but this is not a split in the soul itself but only in its temporal functioning.

Haering also sees mental disturbances as a disturbance of the relationship to the self, illness is caused when the functional unity of the functioning “parts” is disturbed. This is either by a

weakening of the total unity [*durch Lockerung der Gesamtheit*] or a change of domination [*Dominanzwechsel*] within the levels of being bound [*Gebundenheitsgrade*], or through change within the “parts” themselves. A change in the part will change the whole and vice versa. Nevertheless, the illness will be different depending on which side the disturbance lies (Haering 1926, 76).

Body, soul and spirit

Dooyeweerd complains that the word “Spirit” is often used ambiguously. Scheler rightly points out this ambiguity (Dooyeweerd 2023, 225). Part of the problem is that we improperly use “soul” and “spirit” interchangeably. And we refer to “spirit” both as a supratemporal center and as its expression within time in the “spiritual” modalities. Dooyeweerd says that our selfhood, which is spirit, expresses itself in the temporal aspects. Although it expresses itself in all aspects, it is the spiritual, normative aspects in which only the human spirit can express itself. Animals cannot express themselves in these normative areas.

But Dooyeweerd himself is ambiguous in the way that he uses “body” and “soul.” Sometimes Dooyeweerd uses “spirit” to refer to our supratemporal center.⁵⁴ At other times he uses “soul” to refer to this same center.⁵⁵ Sometimes he uses both “soul” and “spirit” to refer to this same supratemporal center.⁵⁶

As we have seen, Dooyeweerd refers to the normative aspects as the “spiritual” [*geestelijk*] aspects. And he uses the word “psychical” to refer to the temporal aspect the psychical. And yet the temporal aspect “psychical” derives from the word for soul, psyche. Dooyeweerd differentiates our brain functions, which he says are psychical, from the act-structure, which includes the normative and intentional acts of our spirit.

⁵⁴ Dooyeweerd refers to the human spirit, which can transcend time, as being able “in religious freedom” to express itself in the entire field of human act life and in all possible differentiated structures (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XXII): The human spirit is the root of a person’s being. From it issue all cosmic subject-functions of a person (Dooyeweerd 1923). The self is the spiritual root-unity [*geestelijke wortel-eenheid*] of human existence. (“Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantie-begrip,” (*Philosophia Reformata* IX (1944), 33)

⁵⁵ The Biblical meaning of the word ‘soul,’ where it is used in its pregnant sense of religious centre of human existence NC II, 111; The soul’s immediate expression in time (Dooyeweerd 2023, 170); “spirit” and “soul” ought to be used only in a religious [supratemporal] sense (Dooyeweerd 2023, 140). The human soul or spirit is the heart of all human existence (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition V); Soul is the hidden root of our existence (Dooyeweerd 2023, 137). Man’s soul is of a spiritual, religious nature and transcends time; knowledge about the soul is religious self-knowledge (Dooyeweerd 2023, 137, 144).

See also Dooyeweerd’s Response to the Curators, July 8, 1939:

In my opinion, *the problem can therefore* only be whether the Reformed principles etc. “compel us to accept a duality [*tweedeeling*] within man’s temporal life, or whether the dichotomy of soul and body must be sought at a deeper level, in the distinction between a religious center of life (as a unity and as consciousness of self and of God) and the whole complex of temporal functions of life.”

⁵⁶ Dooyeweerd 2023, 140-41: All modal functions are concentrated in the spirit or soul. Only this root or center gives human nature its *unity* and *individual totality*. 2023, 170: “the body, in a one-sided dependence, with the soul or the spirit of human.” Dooyeweerd 2023, 190: realization in time of the human body is in unbreakable coherence with the human soul or spirit. And he refers to Kuyper that the “spirit” of human beings, their total creaturely existence is as yet *undivided and undifferentiated* (Dooyeweerd 2023, 140-41). All modal functions concentrated in the spirit or soul.

Dooyeweerd criticizes Haering for having a trichotomistic view of the nature of man. He says that Haering added “spirit” to soul and body (Dooyeweerd 2023, 79).

But this is not so. Haering is emphatic that he is not speaking of three different substances; they are enkaptic intertwinements. There is no body in itself; no psyche in itself (Haering 1926, 84).

For Haering, spirit and body relate as *inner to outer*, with soul mediating between them. Dooyeweerd himself refers to spirit as inner, and to body as outer. And, as we have seen, Dooyeweerd himself divides the modal aspects of our experience into the physical, the psychical and the spiritual [*geestelijk*] aspects.

Dooyeweerd says that actions are the typical realization in the external world of an inner “act,” which is necessarily oriented to a *self-consciousness* and therefore only occurs in *human beings*. The soul is the inner person itself, in the Pauline sense (Dooyeweerd 2023, 119, 141). And in the draft propositions concerning anthropology he says

<According to the scripturally determined anthropological basic idea of the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, total human existence is concentrated in a spiritual unity in the human soul, whereas in the body, this same total human existence is prismatically refracted by time into a diversity of functions and individuality structures. The soul is the “inner man” in Paul’s sense, just as we can see in the “body” the external revelation of man (“the outward man”). The “outward man” is nothing without the “inner man,” but the “inner man” cannot be subjected to temporal, i.e. bodily death, because the inner man transcends cosmic time.>
Dooyeweerd 2023, draft Proposition IX).

In contrast to this “inner,” the body, in its external manifestation, is the “outer person” Rom 7:22; 2 Cor 4:16; Eph. 3:16 (Dooyeweerd 2023, 141). The outer person is nothing without the inner person. The inner person transcends cosmic time. In the soul entire human existence is concentrated as the spiritual unity. In the body, this same total existence is broken through time, as through a prism, into diversity of functions and individuality structures.

Haering uses the term “body” to refer to the physical-biotic structure. He uses “spirit” to refer to the center of our acts. And he uses “psyche” or soul” to refer to the expression of spirit in the normative functions. Haering specifically denies that soul, spirit and body are separate substances. They depend on each other.

Dooyeweerd’s entire fourth enkaptic structure, in which the supratemporal selfhood expresses itself, is what Haering and Scheler refer to as “soul” or “psychical. If there is a difference in Dooyeweerd from Haering and Scheler it is that Haering and Scheler refer to the act-structure as “soul” and the supratemporal selfhood as “spirit.”⁵⁷ But even their usage is not consistent. There is an outer (the body), an inner (the spirit) and the soul that mediates between them.

This is also found in Baader, who also speaks of body, soul and spirit but denies that they are three separate substances. Baader comments on the ambiguity in the way that “soul” is used, sometimes to refer to the supratemporal center and sometimes to the temporal periphery. One must distinguish between a spiritual soul and a non-spiritual soul, which Paul calls the merely psychical man. Paul

⁵⁷ It seems that Dooyeweerd does not call the fourth structure “soul” because he reserves the term “psychical” for mere feeling, and not for the normative functions. Haering sees the psychical as including the normative aspects, the soul’s expression of the spiritual. But this is really only a difference in terminology, since Dooyeweerd also says that it is only the human spirit that can express itself in the normative aspects.

speaks of a spiritual body, and not of the spirit of a body. Our temporal bodies are not our true bodies, but they contain the seed of such a body. The resurrected human body is distinguished from the angelic body. We should not speak of immortality of the soul, but rather of the immortality of the whole man, since the body also continues. We put aside our old corruptible body and put on a new one. (*Werke* 3, 291 fn)

Dooyeweerd makes the same distinctions between physical, psychical and spiritual functions, so it is unfair for him to criticize Haering as having a trichotomistic anthropology.

Reasons for belief in a supratemporal and central selfhood:

a) *Scriptural authority?*

In his draft work on anthropology, Dooyeweerd says numerous times that we have no knowledge of our supratemporal selfhood except through Scripture (Dooyeweerd 2023). Yet in his later discussions with Cornelius van Til, Dooyeweerd repudiated this use of Scripture. He says that there is a problem with trying to obtain deduced principles [*afgeleide beginselen*] from what are perceived as expressly revealed principles (Dooyeweerd 1971). So while Dooyeweerd's ideas on the supratemporal selfhood may "accord with" his interpretation of Scripture, they cannot be said to be derived from it.

If we do not rely on Scripture for this idea of the supratemporal selfhood, we must rely on our experience. Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique attempts to show that our experience requires a supratemporal selfhood. To stay with merely the ego does not provide a center to unify our experience of reality. Baader relied on a transcendental critique as well as on our experience of the paranormal for experiential proof of the supratemporal selfhood (see below).

b) *Freedom*

Haering sees our center as being the source of our freedom of the will and spontaneity (Haering 1926, 93). Is this what Dooyeweerd calls the Enlightenment ground-motive of freedom opposed to nature?⁵⁸ Perhaps, but Dooyeweerd himself speaks of the supratemporal selfhood in terms of freedom! He refers to the human spirit, which can transcend time, as being able "in religious freedom" to express itself in the entire field of human act life and in all possible differentiated structures (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XXII). Since the spirit transcends all temporal structures of life, it must be able to express itself bodily in *all* possible differentiated structures.

For Haering, spirit is the place of "freedom of the will." It is goal-oriented, and this free function of the spirit as the last and highest *principium individuationis* (pp. 92-95). It is also ironic that Dooyeweerd applies the idea of ground-motives against Haering, when Haering himself discusses the idea of ground-motives.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Dooyeweerd's idea of Ground-Motives is one of the weakest parts of his philosophy. A.P. Bos has shown that the form/matter motive does not accurately portray Greek philosophy. Dooyeweerd's distinction between law-side and subject side in individuality structures seems quite close to a form/matter distinction, although Dooyeweerd disputes the idea of substancer. And as we have seen, his emphasis on the freedom of the spirit seems to conflict with his opposition to the Nature/Freedom ground-motive. With respect to the Christian Ground-motive of creation, fall and redemption, these events all occur outside of time, and therefore do not fit within most orthodox Christian views. They are theological ideas and strongly theological in their content, contrary to Dooyeweerd's own distinction between philosophy and theology.

⁵⁹ Haering refers to Spengler's discussion of two conflicting basic drives, collective motive [*Grund-triebe, gemeinsame Motiv*], fear of the world and longing for the world [*Weltangst und Weltsehnsucht*] (Haering 1921, 29).

c) *Survival after death*

The necessity for a supratemporal selfhood is shown by our belief in survival after death. This is not a strict proof of such survival, but it is a rational reason for believing in such a selfhood. Without such a belief, we cannot have any basis for the idea that our soul/spirit “lays down its body” at death.

Dooyeweerd says that the “soul” of man’s existence is the “integral center of the whole of his bodily existence.” This soul transcends all temporal things:

Scripture...views the body as this temporal existence as a whole. And this temporal body is to be laid down at death. In contrast, according to Scriptural revelation, the human soul or spirit, as the religious root of the body, <or as the “inner man”> is not subject to temporal death, because the soul in fact transcends all temporal things (although outside of Christ, the soul <with the body> is subject to eternal death) (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition V).

The anthropology of the Philosophy of the Law Idea is founded on the Scriptural Idea of the human soul as the integral religious root of the whole of man’s temporal existence. In this religious root, human life is still “undivided” (Cf. Kuyper, especially the *Stone Lectures*), because in this center all temporal functions are concentrated in the basic religious relation to the Origin of all things. (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition IX)

Dooyeweerd’s brother-in-law Dirk Vollenhoven denied any such continuance of the selfhood after death, although he did believe that we would be resurrected at the Last Day. But until the Last Day, we do not exist. Giving up this belief in continuance after death caused a very lengthy nervous breakdown for Vollenhoven.

William Hasker calls people who hold this belief in our non-existence until the resurrection “Christian materialists” And Hasker shows how the belief does not make sense philosophically. If there is no existence after death, then how can there be identity of the resurrected body? Because the body decomposes, and the elements are taken up in the composition of other organic and inorganic materials, it is even questionable whether there can be a resurrection of the same *molecules*. At most, there is a creation of a duplicate or cloned body, but it would not be the *same* body (Hasker 1999, 211, 216). Nor does the Biblical record claim such a view of non-continuance after death.

d) *Original sin*

One of the main reasons that Dooyeweerd posits a supratemporal selfhood is that otherwise we do not have a basis for the doctrine of original sin, although he struggles with how we can be individually responsible if the fall occurred when we existed undivided in the root. The radical community and solidarity of the human race in creation and fall guarantees the doctrine of original sin; it also condemns psycho-creationism (Dooyeweerd 2023, 218).

Baader also places importance on this doctrine in relation to the supratemporal selfhood, and he has the same problem with individual responsibility (*Werke 2*, 219).

Although it is clear that there evil in the world, I do not find this a persuasive argument. It is far too theological, and it is a doctrine that I do not subscribe to.

e) *Epistemology*

(1) Distinction between naïve experience and theory

The idea of a supratemporal selfhood allows Dooyeweerd to contrast our pre-theoretical or naïve experience (which is *reflective and enstatic*) with our theoretical experience, which breaks apart the unity of our experience into a *dis-stasis*. This is done by our selfhood moving into the temporal and setting the analytical aspect *over-against* the other aspects, which are its “*Gegenstand*.”⁶⁰ This gives an “objectification” of the pre-logical aspects in the logical aspect, and allows us to distinguish the post-logical aspects of our experience. It therefore deepens our experience, but it also impairs the unity of our experience, and the resulting theoretical dis-stasis must be brought back in a synthesis with the unity of the selfhood by our intuition.⁶¹

Already in 1921, Haering says that science proceeds from the web of a given diversity of pre-scientific “factors” of our experience. These factors are qualitatively diverse. They include the psychical, and the material, and within the material they include the inorganic (physical and chemical) and the organic and physiological.⁶² When science sets the psychical over-against the material factors of natural science, it narrows these factors of our pre-scientific worldview. Science must ask whether it is justified in doing so, and whether its findings really correspond to reality.

⁶⁰ The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions (Dooyeweerd *Encyclopedia of Law*, 1946 Edition, 12). Naïve thought has no “opposite” to its logical function and does not perform any inter-modal theoretical synthesis, but is operative in the full temporal reality in *enstasis*. Naïve experience is a concrete experience of things and their relations in the fulness of individual temporal reality. The analytical subject-object relation also has a merely enstatic character here. (NC II, 468). Strauss incorrectly says that for Dooyeweerd, analysis and abstraction are equivalent; we synthesize logically discerned properties in a concept (Strauss 2009, 14 -15).

⁶¹ For references, see Friesen 2003; Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XV. As Glass and De Ridder acknowledge, Dooyeweerd’s view of theory then has the effect of reducing our integral knowledge. They do not say why there is such impairment of our knowledge. For Dooyeweerd, it is because the logical aspect splits apart the coherence of the world. In pre-theoretical experience, we experience it as a *systasis*; in theory it is a *dis-stasis*. He says that this both opens up our naïve experience as well as inhibits some of our knowledge. This has not been sufficiently explored by reformational philosophers.

Although theory allows us to open up our experience, it is also a partial knowledge, and needs a synthesis back to the full experience of our selfhood. This is done by our intuition. The need for this synthesis back to the full experience of our selfhood is the point of a passage in Dooyeweerd’s *Collected Works*. (Dooyeweerd 2023, 239) But instead of trying to understand this draft article, the editor Strauss again inserts his own views, and promotes his own understanding of theory, all of which were emphatically rejected by Dooyeweerd (Dooyeweerd 1975).

Theory cannot investigate individuality structures because theory cannot investigate the continuity of cosmic time. Theory is a “dis-stasis” or splitting up of the continuity of cosmic time, and theory can only investigate this dis-stasis, this discontinuity of time. (*Grenzen* 59, Dooyeweerd 1975, “*Gegenstandsrelatie*,” 86, 93, 98).

⁶² Haering says (p. 61) that it is better to enumerate too many of these qualitatively different factors than too few. The active side of the psychical includes the conscious and the unconscious, primary tendencies such as judgement, comparison, and attention, as well as the aesthetic *Verhaltensweisen* [modes of representation]. Each psychical function also has its own psychical content. [This seems similar to Dooyeweerd’s subject-object relation within each mode]. Both function and contents are “moments” of the historical *Gegenstand*. And at p. 202, he says 202 individual types with their own structures against special instance of universal laws. Haering says that Brentano’s idea of functions with their intentional contents is just a special case of the form and content within every real *Funktionseinheit* (Haering 1926, 78).

Science abstracts from the empirical situation, explains, and then needs to bring its findings back into agreement [*in Einklang gebracht*] (Haering 1921, pp. 55-59).⁶³

Bringing back our abstracted findings into agreement with our selfhood is what Dooyeweerd's synthesis is all about. It is not between two actual functions, but rather between my *actual* thought [in the temporal coherence of my concrete act of thinking, which is a temporal expression of an act from out of my supratemporal selfhood in the religious dimension] and the non-logical aspects lifted out of ("abstracted from") the temporal coherence of my experience.

(2) Transcendental critique and Epistemology

Dooyeweerd's transcendental critique of theoretical thought tries to prove the necessity of a coherence of temporal reality, of its center in the supratemporal selfhood and of the eternal Origin of everything. Postmodern philosophers may have given up on looking for any such unities or any Totality in the sense of *Ganzheit*, but it is important to understand Dooyeweerd's philosophy in its own right.

Dooyeweerd's idea of the supratemporal selfhood is of help in understanding his view of theory, and of the *Gegenstand*-relation. We need to analyze this in some detail, since of course this view of theory is what Dooyeweerd's *New Critique of Theoretical Thought* is all about. Dooyeweerd devotes considerable attention to this in his philosophical anthropology, and compares it to Max Scheler's views on the subject (Dooyeweerd 1942 and 2023). He cites Scheler's 1927 book *Man's Place in Nature*.

Der Mensch allein—sofern er Person ist—vermag sich über sich—als Lebewesen—emporzuschwingen und von einem Zentrum gleichsam jenseits der raumzeitlichen Welt aus alles, darunter auch sich selbst, zum Gegenstande seiner Erkenntnis zu machen. [...]

Das Zentrum aber, von dem aus der Mensch die Akte vollzieht, durch welche er seinen Leib und seine Psyche vergegenständlicht, die Welt in ihrer räumlichen und zeitlichen Fülle gegenständlich macht—es kann nicht selbst ein "Teil" eben dieser Welt sein, kann also auch kein bestimmtes Irgendwo und Irgendwann besitzen: es kann nur im obersten Seinsgrunde selbst gelegen sein.

[Only human beings—to the extent that they are persons—are able to ascend above their organic being, and to transform, from a center *beyond* the spatiotemporal world, everything (himself included) into a *Gegenstand* of his knowledge.

The center, however, from which man performs the acts by means of which he objectifies his body, psyche and the world in its spatial and temporal abundance cannot itself be "part" of this world. It cannot be located in space or time: It can only be located in the *ultimate Ground of Being* itself.] (my translation)⁶⁴

⁶³ In his 1957 work, (p. 338), Haering Cites Goethe: "Dich im Unendlichen zu finden, must Du erst trennen und dann verbinden" (In order to find the oneself in the infinite, one must first separate and then combine). Haering says that this separation and differentiation [*Trennung (Differenzierung)*] applies to the various domains [*Seinsgebiete*] (Nicolai Hartmann's "*Seinsschichten*") in our overall reality [*Gesamtwirklichkeit*]; it applies to the inorganic (unliving), to the organic (living), psychical [*beseelte*] and spiritual [*geistige*].

⁶⁴ Cited by Dooyeweerd 2011, 230. References are at first unclear because the *Collected Works* improperly uses "*Ibid*" in the footnotes when the footnotes refer to multiple sources. This is my own translation, which makes clear that we rise above the organic. I also leave "*Gegenstand*" untranslated. See discussion of the meaning of "object" and "objectification." Strauss's translation, like that of Meyerhoff, also confuses *Gegenstand* and "object of knowledge."

The passage from Scheler shows that it was common in Dooyeweerd's time to consider theory as the relation of a transcendent selfhood and a *Gegenstand*. This sounds at first very much like Dooyeweerd's view. Dooyeweerd even asks whether people will not think he has misunderstood Scheler.

Dooyeweerd tries to distinguish his philosophy from Scheler's in at these ways:

(i) Scheler sees the acts of a supratemporal selfhood in theoretical terms. He does not acknowledge naïve experience or pre-theoretical thought. Scheler, who said, "There is nothing more certain than the fact that all the objects given in natural observation, are given as singular and individual objects." Dooyeweerd says that Scheler has already theorized our experience, for we do not experience separate things in naive experience:

It is of great methodological importance to point out that by limiting my theoretical attention to this concrete natural thing, I am actually engaged in a theoretical abstraction. In veritable naive experience, things are not experienced as completely separate entities. This point is ignored or rather denied by Scheler. It must be emphasized, however, if we are to understand the plastic horizon of reality, and if we are to avoid a naturalistic and atomistic interpretation of the latter (*NC III*, 54).

Haering also says that it is already an abstraction to view things apart from time and space (Haering 1926, 49).

Scheler wants to see an intentional relatedness to a *Gegenstand* as a guarantee of the pure spiritual character of the acts. But for Dooyeweerd, the *Gegenstand*-relation is "exclusively a feature of acts of theoretical knowing." It is a result of abstraction from the continuity of time,⁶⁵ where the logical aspect of the act of knowing, having been abstracted from the actually existing coherence of the aspects, is placed over against the non-logical aspects of the fields of investigations.

Dooyeweerd's objection is that Scheler sees the selfhood entirely in terms of logical thought. For Dooyeweerd, the logical is merely one aspect of our temporal experience. And yet in Dooyeweerd's own discussion of the *Gegenstand*-relation, he says that our selfhood uses the logical aspect when it attempts to oppose or stand over-against the *Gegenstand*. For Dooyeweerd, a theory of human acts cannot be built on the *Gegenstand*-relation.

But Scheler is much closer to Dooyeweerd's thought than he acknowledges. Although Dooyeweerd emphasizes that our selfhood is not merely logical, but expresses itself in all temporal aspects, in theoretical thought it acts *as-if* it were logical. The coherence of reality is split apart in a way that does not correspond to reality (Friesen 2003). In the theoretical *Gegenstand*-relation, we objectify reality in the sense that we look at it as if it were foreign to us. That is why our theoretical analysis must be brought back into a synthesis with our actual selfhood. We again make it "our own."⁶⁶

In opposing the temporal as a *Gegenstand*, we objectify it, but that is different from the subject-object relation. In objectifying, we make temporal reality strange to us, not "our own." That is why the results of theoretical thought need to be brought back into a synthesis with the actuality of our real self. *WdW* 1, 50: objectifying is not the same as the "setting over-against" in the theoretical *Gegenstand*-relation.

⁶⁵ Abstraction from the continuity of time is not the same meaning as abstraction of properties from things.

⁶⁶ Recognizing temporal reality as "our-own" is emphasized by Dooyeweerd as well as by Haering [*uns eigen*] (Haering 1926, 94: it is where we recognize our acts as our own, and where we distinguish our experience from that

Acts are all activities which proceed from the soul or spirit, but which function within the enkaptically structured whole of the human body. By these activities, man directs himself intentionally to states of affairs in temporal reality or to the world of imagination. “By relating these (now) intentional states of affairs to his “I-ness” he makes them *internally his own*.” (Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XIV)

(ii) The supratemporal selfhood exists *in realiter*, whereas Scheler says it exists only in the relational acts of the selfhood; for Scheler, the selfhood is pure actuality, and has its being only in the free exercise of its activity (Dooyeweerd 2023, 227). Dooyeweerd says there is an (ontical) correlation between the reflecting pure consciousness and its *Gegenstand*. If it were purely relational, the self would not be absolute (Dooyeweerd 2023, 239-241). Dooyeweerd says that Husserl and Scheler see acts as purely incorporeal [*onlichaamelijk*]; they are pure intentional experiences. Scheler believes that these acts proceed from the selfhood which, as a person’s center, lives purely in its acts (Dooyeweerd 1942m Proposition XV).

Dooyeweerd tries to contrast his views from Scheler in his insistence that the selfhood, as the source of our acts, has reality apart from its actions. How does this fit with Dooyeweerd’s idea that the selfhood has no reality except insofar as it participates in God? At most, Dooyeweerd can merely claim a relative reality for the selfhood. Is that really so different from Scheler?⁶⁷

(iii) That Scheler reifies the spiritual functions (Dooyeweerd 2023, 241- 242). Could not the same be said of Dooyeweerd? In any case, how can Scheler be said to be reifying the spiritual functions if the selfhood has its being only in the free exercise of its activity? That does not sound like reification. Scheler was in fact very aware of the problems of reification of the mental functions. He refers to the central unity of the selfhood as the center of our acts, and Scheler even uses the term “Act-Structure.” He says,

Spirit is the only being incapable of becoming an object. It is pure actuality. It has its being only in and through the execution of its acts. The center of spirit, the person, is not an object or a substantial kind of being, but a continuously self-executing, ordered structure of acts. The person is only in and through his acts.

Dooyeweerd says that Scheler has reified the normative functions of reality as “spirit,” but only after “logicizing” these functions (Dooyeweerd 2023, p. 230). Yet on the same page of the passage cited from Kant, Scheler refers to Kant, who was the first to elevate “spirit” (in the sense of the transcendental apperception) above “psyche,” and who expressly denied that spirit was nothing but a group of functions belonging to a so-called mental substance, or soul, which owes its fictitious status merely to an unjustified reification of the actual unity of the spirit.

(iv) For Scheler, spirit is not capable of creating but merely of directing or steering and guiding the physical and psychical energy. Dooyeweerd wants to give more creative power to spirit.

Despite these differences from Scheler, Dooyeweerd’s view of theory and the *Gegenstand*-relation is closer to that of Scheler than it is to those reformational philosophers like Strauss who deny both

of others). Dooyeweerd says that Scheler has no such synthesis, since he starts from theoretical experience. Scheler banishes the role of reflective-actual intuition (Dooyeweerd 2023, 228).

⁶⁷ Dooyeweerd’s denial of the reality of the temporal reality and even of the selfhood “*an sich*” or in itself raises questions as to whether created reality is then *maya*, illusion, existing only in the mind of God. I think that there are some parallels here, but I find more agreement with Hindu ideas that explain *maya* in terms of the sustaining power or *shakti* of God.

the supratemporal selfhood,⁶⁸ who deny the *Gegenstand*-relation, and who attempt to substitute the purely temporal analytical subject-object relation.

f) *Paranormal*

The idea of the supratemporal selfhood allows us to understand paranormal experiences.

(1) *Silberblick*

Baader says that in our supratemporal selfhood, we do not see into another world, but rather we see into the same world from a different perspective (*Werke* 4, 3). Thus, we are not seeing into a different world; this is not a case of an ascent to the heavens, as in the experience of St Paul. It is seeing the present world differently. This seeing can include paranormal phenomena in dreams and visions, including seeing future events, but it can also be the view from Totality, which he calls the “*Silberblick*” (*Werke* 4, 114). Dooyeweerd also refers to moments when the transcendent religious horizon is opened. This opening illuminates our temporal world:

In the Biblical attitude of naïve experience the transcendent, religious dimension of its horizon is opened. The light of eternity radiates perspectively through all the temporal dimensions of this horizon and even illuminates seemingly trivial things and events in our sinful world (*NC* III, 29).

Baader explains this in terms of ec-stasy, a standing outside of oneself, when the soul (Dooyeweerd’s fourth enkaptic structure) is temporarily suspended.

(2) Hypnosis

Baader sees hypnosis as a suspension of the soul, and control by another central self. Dooyeweerd seems to follow this when he says that hypnotic conditions and the psychiatric disorder of schizophrenia concern the *corporal* individuality structure of the human personality; they can even be localized in the brain (Dooyeweerd 2023, 170).

(3) Clairvoyance, telepathy. Dooyeweerd makes no mention of this. For Baader, the supratemporal selfhood makes it possible.

(4) Hauntings

Dooyeweerd says that at death, a person “lays down” his temporal body, his “mantle of functions.” Baader says that at death, the life of the body and brain is drawn towards the heart center of man. The heart is the place of ascent, just as spirit is the place of descent. This is Jacob’s ladder. Both the central principle of our selfhood and its secondary helpers leave the body, at least in normal death. But in cases of violent death (suicide, murder), some individuals don’t have time to move all temporal functions to the supratemporal center and that is why there are hauntings and ghosts

⁶⁸ Because they deny a transcendent, supratemporal selfhood, Dooyeweerd calls these philosophers “immanence philosophers.” “Immanence” is here directed not to a denial of God’s transcendence, but a denial of man’s transcendence. But Strauss tries to explain theoretical thought from within temporal reality, by the temporal subject-object relation within the logical aspect. Using Dooyeweerd’s terminology, this is immanence philosophy. That is why Dooyeweerd can say that Strauss’s views do not differ from modern epistemology (Dooyeweerd 1975). Dooyeweerd says that immanence philosophy has only an immanent understanding of totality and therefore absolutizes temporal reality. Therefore, immanence philosophy can never come to a structural concept of a thing, but always either concepts of function or metaphysical substance. This is quite an astounding assertion. Immanence philosophy, which understands totality in a merely temporal sense, can never come to the proper structural concept of a thing!

who seek release.⁶⁹ This is not so much a return from the dead as a failure to complete the transition to the afterlife. It is not a *revenant*, but a *non-allant* (*Werke* 4, 144, 247).

He quotes St. Martin, who said he does not believe in revenants but only in “*restants*”—those who stay. Baader, relying on De Pasqually, calls them not “revenants” but “*non-allants*” (*Werke* 4, 247). Spiritualists who believe they are communing with the departed person are really only contacting this temporary physical continuance (*Werke* 4, 444). The body is temporarily without a soul [*entseelt*] and the soul is without a body [*entleibt*]. But the soul always seeks embodiment, just as a center always has a periphery in which to *express* itself

This experience of separation of our center and of our secondary helpers (limbs, *Glieder*) is also experienced in sleep; we awake restored. And it is also experienced in hypnosis (and somnambulism), as well as in states of ecstasy, when we are outside ourselves in an *ek-stasis*. These states are a foretaste of death.

Even if the dead do not return as revenants, this is not to say that we do not have communion with them *in some other form*. This is the belief in the communion of the saints.

Christ is the prime example of a *non-allant*, with whom we have communion. Christ is raised beyond time but he is still active in time. His presence remains with us, in the church and in the Eucharist. But at some time, there will be a full outer presence as well, when the Kingdom of God is revealed.

In his death, Jesus experienced the same being torn apart into body and soul, something that is not natural but was occasioned by the fall of man. In overcoming this, he opened the way for us to overcome death. Dooyeweerd also sees the cross as a symbol of the intersection between time and eternity. Dooyeweerd does not defend any doctrine of the cross as substitutionary atonement. If Christ’s death is an overcoming of sin, it is an overcoming of the split in our nature caused by death.

g) *Connection to other thinkers*

The belief in a supratemporal selfhood as distinct from a temporal ego allows connections with psychological ideas like those of C.G. Jung. As already noted, Dooyeweerd speaks of pathological issues in the ego. These pathologies have to do with wrong relations to our selfhood.

The Afterlife

The soul as the “inner person” is not subject to death (Dooyeweerd 2023, 143). But Dooyeweerd avoids the question of what activities the soul can do after death—the soul cannot be found in what is temporal. But he rejects the idea of the “sleep of the soul” (Dooyeweerd 2023, 217).

In general, Dooyeweerd does not speculate about the afterlife. He says that at death we give up or “lay down” our mantle of bodily functions [*functiemantel*]. That temporal *functiemantel* falls away.

⁶⁹ Baader *Werke* 2, 266; 4, 290; 16, 61; 4, Cf. C.G. Jung who said these are “split-off psychical complexes.” See Marie-Louise von Franz: *Zahl und Zeit: Psychologische Überlegungen zu einer Annäherung von Tiefenpsychologie und Physik*, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1990), p. 248. See also Jung’s Dissertation, “Zur Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter occulter Phänomene,” (Leipzig 1902). Also: Jung on Synchronicity and the Paranormal.

Dooyeweerd says that our existence in the afterlife is “supra-individual.” This does not mean “universal,” and it does not mean “more than one.” Nor does it mean trans-personal (NC III, 246). It is not a narcissistic individualism, with an enlightened ego separate from all other enlightened egos. But nor does it mean that we lose our individuality and become merged in the Godhead. It is fulfilled being, fulfilled selfhood (NC II, 418: “the ultimate individual,” “the fullness of individuality”). True individuality, or the fullness of individuality, is found in the supratemporal, and temporal individuality is a refraction of that fullness. Therefore, there is only a relative individuality within time (NC III, 65).

Dooyeweerd cites Kuyper: individuals do not exist in themselves, but only as *membra corporis generis humani*. Christ is the head of humanity (NC II, 248). This is not a denial of individuality in the afterlife, but an emphasis that even in the afterlife, we do not exist except as related to and as participating in Christ the Root of creation. It means connected to others in a new way and connected to the new root in Christ.

This is difficult stuff. For Dooyeweerd, life, as the biotic mode, is also a temporal aspect/mode. Steen reports a discussion he had with Dooyeweerd (Steen, 85) Steen asked how it is possible to conceive of a resurrected person without all the functions and without the law-spheres continuing to hold. Steen felt that Dooyeweerd did not give a satisfactory reply.

Baader, never afraid to speculate, says that individuality is retained in the afterlife. He says we should not even say that we live forever, since living is what is said in reference to the temporal. And we also preserve the individuality of animals and temporal life that we have cared for during our temporal existence. Baader says that it would be wrong to think that there is no further appearance [*Wiedervortreten*] of the individual from the general after death; that would be no resurrection of the dead. But it would also be wrong to think that this is just a repetition of our first temporal situation. In our second appearance, we are nature-free, although not nature-less. We are free of time and space, but not spaceless and timeless (*Werke* 4, 27). We receive a new spiritual body.⁷⁰ There is a fulfilled individuality (*Werke* 4, 24). And although our experience will not be the same as our temporal life, it will not be less:

...the visible comes from the invisible, but man doesn't usually see that the not seen, not heard, not understood, unmoved is not only not nothing, but is not less than the visible, audible, understandable, movable, but more than these. It is the Seeing, Hearing, Understanding and Moving (*Werke* 4, 159).

Origin of the spirit/soul (as transcendent selfhood)

There are several views as to when the supratemporal selfhood is created:

1. Creationism. This is Aquinas's view—God directly creates a soul for every human being that comes into existence. The issue is whether that creation is at conception or after a period of time. Brian Leftow has suggested that this can be combined with the idea of emerging evolution: when the physical body is ready, the soul arrives. A problem with this is that it views God as being “on call” to perform the act of creation at each moment. It is in conflict with Dooyeweerd, who believed that creation was completed.

⁷⁰ Note that there is a conflict here between the belief in resurrection of the physical earthly body and the giving of a new spiritual body after death.

Dooyeweerd rejects this creationist view:

The Creationist viewpoint says that God creates a soul each time a human being is conceived. The Bible seems to place a separation between the creation of the physical body and the creation of the soul (Ecclesiastes 12:7; Isaiah 42:5; Zechariah 12:1; Hebrews 12:9). In Roman Catholic science, various scientists have taken the position that evolutionism is acceptable with respect to the human “material body”, but that the “human soul” in the sense of *anima rationalis* is called into being by an immediate creative act of God. From a Reformational point of view, such a conception must be rejected. (Dooyeweerd 2023, Dooyeweerd 1942, Proposition XXXXI)

2. Pre-existence of the soul. This is the view that all souls have been created prior to becoming embodied in the world. This view is often associated with reincarnation, where a "warehouse" of souls exists in heaven, all of whom were created by God at the beginning, and each time a new body is created, God attaches a soul to it.

3. Generationism. This is Dooyeweerd’s view. There is a physical generation of the body in time, and a spiritual generation of the soul outside of time from the first parents. For Dooyeweerd, there is both a physical generation of the temporal body in time, and a supratemporal generation of the selfhood. The generation of humans thus has both a spiritual and corporal aspect in the creation order.

The idea of spiritual creation is similar to pre-existence in that it holds that all souls have *already been created*. It differs from other views of pre-existence in that Dooyeweerd says that this creation, which has been completed, is in the spiritual “root” of creation, which derives from Adam and includes all humanity. In this spiritual root, not only is our selfhood undivided from other selves, it is itself undivided. This is Dooyeweerd’s idea of Totality. Many hearts unfold from this root community. But this spiritual unfolding is not in time. Time only governs bodily generation (Steen, 244).

As in the case of Aquinas’s creationism, there is a time gap before the soul is revealed in the temporal body. For the first while, the body is the body of the mother. Only later is the soul “added.” Creation did not occur in time, and creation is completed. It is being “worked out” in the corporal existence of a person. The human soul can only manifest in the body when the act structure has developed (Dooyeweerd 223, 218).

This is also Baader’s view. He quotes Boehme saying that the soul comes after three months. For advocates of abortion, this is both good and bad news. The good news is that there is not a full person at the moment of conception. The bad news is that it is only 3 months before there is full personhood in the womb.

Dooyeweerd does not say much about when the soul is added to the body. Rather, how God has united soul and body is an “unfathomable mystery.” To speak of “pre-existence” of the soul is metaphysical; all that Dooyeweerd will say is that the soul is the condition or presupposition for the human body (Dooyeweerd 2023, 218).

I would point out that there is a conflict here in the idea of the supratemporal self in relation to the body. If the body is the expression of the supratemporal selfhood, how can the body be derived from the mother and not from the supratemporal selfhood? This is not so much a problem of “the ghost in the machine,” but a problem of spirit inhabiting another organism. The picture I have is of a hermit crab inhabiting a shell created by another creature. Logically, the supratemporal

selfhood should also be in existence at conception, so that the body is its own expression, the expression in the periphery of time from the center beyond time.

4. Traducianism: This is the view that God created the souls of the first parents, Adam and Eve, and thereafter, the immaterial soul is transmitted from those parents in time, along with the material body. The soul is transmitted with the seed to the child from its parents; this can be viewed as a kind of materialism. The soul is thus created by natural generation. Dooyeweerd denies this, seemingly on the grounds that it cannot account for a supratemporal selfhood.⁷¹ Baader denies it on the grounds of the “simplicity” of the soul, by which I believe he means the same thing.

Both ‘*psycho-creationism*’ and ‘*tradicianism*’ (which is favored in Lutheran circles) are contrary to the ground-motive of Divine Word revelation. Both conceptions are dominated, at least in part, by the Greek form-matter motive.

Psycho-creationism is not only in conflict with the Scriptural teaching concerning original sin but it is also in conflict with the creation story itself. Gen. 2:1 tells us emphatically that the *entire* creation has been *completed*. (Dooyeweerd 1942, Prop XXXII).

5. Physical production of the soul. This is similar to traducianism. The soul is created physically. This was the view of Jakob Frohschammer (1821-1893). Frohschammer’s book, *Über den Ursprung der menschlichen Seelen*, was condemned by the Vatican in 1857. Frohschammer seems to oppose Baader’s view of Genesis. Frohschammer thinks God created man and wife as persons, not first as spirits and then as persons (Frohschammer, 15).

6. Panpsychism. This is the view that all of temporal reality has spirit. It is the view of Gustav Fechner. Ken Wilber adopts these views: he refers to Fechner, one of whose books he found “while rummaging through a store filled with wonderfully old philosophy books” (Wilber, 2000). Ken Wilber says is an *involution* from Spirit down to matter, and an *evolution* back from matter to Spirit. For this idea of evolutionary ascending consciousness, Wilber was influenced by the Hindu sage Aurobindo (1872-1950). There is a hierarchy of levels from the subconscious (pre-personal), to the self-conscious (personal—rational) and finally to the superconscious (transpersonal). (Friesen 2010).

Wundt also refers to Gustav Fechner, and in particular to his *Zend-avesta oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits*. Dooyeweerd makes express reference to that book, so we know he read it (*WdW* III, 554ft; *NC* III, 631 ft). So Dooyeweerd was familiar with Fechner’s views long before Wilber re-discovered them. Dooyeweerd regards Fechner’s views as pantheism (*NC* III, 630- 31). But is this really pantheism? I don’t think it is, although it is panentheism. And as we shall see in the article on emergent evolution, Dooyeweerd’s own views on creation are panentheistic.

Conclusion

Dooyeweerd developed his ideas of individuality structures and enkapsis from Martin Heidenhain, Theodor Haering, Max Wundt, and Max Scheler. Dooyeweerd does not sufficiently acknowledge his indebtedness to these earlier writers. Dooyeweerd also sometimes unfairly criticizes them. When he finds one difference, he makes it key, and then makes some very hard polemics against the person from whom he has learned so much.

⁷¹ Dooyeweerd also does not see how this can account for original sin.

Dooyeweerd's ideas of individuality structures and their enkaptic interlacement remain of interest today. Rieppel's work shows it is of interest even for non-reformational philosophers. We can make comparisons to other philosophers like Ken Wilber's idea of nested holons.

I have emphasized Dooyeweerd's view that an individuality structure is the entity itself. Individuality structures are not just laws that apply to entities. And enkapsis is a special kind of relationship between individuality structures. It is more than just an interlacement of entities.

Without understanding individuality structures and enkapsis, we cannot understand Dooyeweerd's philosophical anthropology. His enkaptic interlacement of four structures in the human being are already found in Haering, as well as the idea of our central "spirit" that transcends time.

Dooyeweerd's ideas of a supratemporal selfhood, in contrast to a temporal ego, are an extension of Haering's ideas, as well as a use of other ideas from Franz von Baader's Christian theosophy, and those who were influenced by Baader, like Max Scheler. And Dooyeweerd's idea of a religious root beyond time is an idea that certainly derives from Baader, although Kuyper also incorporated Baader's ideas to some extent.

Most reformational philosophers have either rejected or misinterpreted Dooyeweerd's ideas of "individuality structures" and "enkapsis." Because of that, they also misinterpret or deny Dooyeweerd's philosophical anthropology. It is one thing to disagree with Dooyeweerd. I have indicated some of my own disagreements. But it is quite another to present such critique as Dooyeweerd's own ideas. Why do these reformational philosophers do this? These are intelligent philosophers who nevertheless seem incapable of reading the original text. To be sure, there may be an "excess of meaning" in what Dooyeweerd said, and his insights can be developed further. But that is different from interpreting his ideas to say the opposite of what he actually said.

There are many possible reasons for these misinterpretations of Dooyeweerd. Some of these philosophers are trying to preserve (Calvinistic) theological ideas that are alien to Dooyeweerd's philosophy. But Dooyeweerd's view of creation, fall and redemption are not derived from Calvinistic sources, but from Christian theosophy. The idea of the spiritual root of creation and our participation in that root are especially key to Dooyeweerd, and foreign to Calvinism. His ideas of the modal aspects, individuality structures and enkapsis are also derived from either theosophical or mystical sources; they are not Calvinistic in origin. And Dooyeweerd opposed using theology or even the Bible as a source for philosophical ideas.

Others have misinterpreted his ideas in an attempt to preserve a conservative political view of social structures and to promote ideas of limited state involvement. These people tend to latch onto the idea of sphere sovereignty, but deny the idea of individuality structures and enkapsis.

Some are trying to combine the ideas of Dooyeweerd and Dirk Vollenhoven, contrary to their own assessment of the radical differences between them. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven disagreed on almost every key point, whether philosophical or theological.

Some are trying to preserve what they think is a distinct and original heritage of reformational philosophy at the Vrije Universiteit. They are threatened when these ideas are shown not to be original.

Still others are attempting to relate Dooyeweerd to current postmodernist ideas. They reject as "metaphysical" his key ideas of cosmic time and the supratemporal selfhood. And they try to use his ideas of presuppositions to promote ideas of worldview in the sense of presuppositions that allow us to interpret facts differently. They do not understand that by "presuppositions,"

Dooyeweerd was referring to ontical *presupposita*, and when he refers to worldview, he is referring not to propositions, but literally to the way that we view the world from a non-temporal perspective.

Finally, the misrepresentations reflect a general disregard by reformational philosophers for the importance of the history of philosophy in favour of systematic philosophy. There has been very little research on the sources of Dooyeweerd's philosophy. Instead, reformational philosophers tend to jump too quickly attempted systematization of their own ideas. To look at the historical sources of Dooyeweerd's ideas results in a much more nuanced appreciation of his work, and a less combative stance against others.

All of these misinterpretations of Dooyeweerd seem to reflect what Harold Bloom called "the anxiety of influence," resulting in what Bloom called "strong" and sometimes "deliberate" misreadings.

Of course, Dooyeweerd's philosophy is itself a strong misinterpretation of Calvinism. The curators of the Vrije Universiteit were correct when they questioned whether Dooyeweerd's philosophy was Calvinistic. One of the Curators, Valentin Hepp, even tried translating some of Dooyeweerd's philosophy into German in order to try to find Dooyeweerd's German sources. We have better tools now, and it is evident that Dooyeweerd's philosophy fits into the German theosophical/mystical tradition as exemplified in Boehme, Baader, Novalis, Heidenhain, Haering, Spann and others like them. It is there that we find the mythological narratives of what occurred "before time" and the philosophical anthropology where humans live both in time and outside of time. These philosophies explain Dooyeweerd's interpretation of "creation, fall and redemption" insofar as he places all of these events outside of time. It is also in these German traditions that we find the sources of anti-Enlightenment polemics and the conservative politics that would so influence Dutch politicians like Kuyper and Groen van Prinsterer. Dooyeweerd's philosophy can be seen as a 20th century repository of these German theosophical/mystical ideas. Dooyeweerd tried to show links back to Kuyper's neo-Calvinism. But the fact that his philosophy "accords with" some of those earlier ideas does not show its true sources.

In turn, Kuyper's neo-Calvinism was a strong misinterpretation of Calvinism. That is why it was called "neo-Calvinism." At first, "neo-Calvinism" was used as a negative term of reproach, but later it was adopted by its adherents. Neo-Calvinism is not the theology of John Calvin. And John Calvin in turn gave a strong misinterpretation of Christianity. His theology does not fit with what we know of the historical Jesus and the Jewish sources that influenced Jesus in his apocalyptic messianism.

These ideas and misinterpretations are difficult to unwind. But surely that is part of the task of philosophy. If we want to understand what a philosopher means, we need to look at the context and sources of these ideas and whether he/she used them the same way. Nor can we attempt to build our own philosophy and theology by disregarding the history of these ideas. All of this may leave us with more questions than answers. But surely that is what makes philosophy interesting.

What we need to do is to understand Dooyeweerd on his own terms to relate his ideas to his sources, and then to clearly indicate where we might disagree.

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