Linked Glossary of Terms
(references to the Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee unless indicated. See concordance for correlation with pages in the New Critique. The concordance is in pdf format.)
| supratemporal | I, 55, 57 (supratemporal unity-totality), 60 (supposed supratemporal essence of things), 66 (heart as supra-temporal unity), 71 (fulfillment)
NC I, 31 (concentration point; a rigid and static supratemporality is a metaphysical Greek idea), I, 31 fn1 (supratemporal is more than merely pre-functional); 32 (rejects idea of central trans-cosmic time for the supratemporal), 33 (revealed supratemporal realm, the supratemporal central sphere of human existence and of divine revelation), 106 (supratemporal fulfillment) De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (1931) |
| supertemporal | NC II, 41, 53 (from WdW II, 51, ‘boventijdelijk’); 472 (from WdW II, 407, ‘tijd-transcendeerdende’ or ‘time-transcending’); 538 (super-temporal ideas, original ‘boven-tidelijke’)
The meaning is the same as ‘supratemporal,’ and is merely an inconsistent English translation. |
| time-transcending | I, 64 (time-transcending root of our individual person), 66, |
The supratemporal is that which is above the temporal, above cosmic time. The supratemporal includes the eternity of God, as well as the intermediate realm of the aevum, which is the realm of our supratemporal selfhood or heart. It is also the realm of other created beings such as angels, although Dooyeweerd does not speculate on their nature.
Dooyeweerd had planned to devote a whole book to his philosophical anthropology (See NC III, 781). This was to be Volume III in the planned trilogy Reformation and Scholasticism. Volume III was never completed, although in his 1964 lecture, Dooyeweeerd said that he still planned to do so. Dooyeweerd did draft a lot of material that was intended for the book. That material has been thoroughly investigated by W.J. Ouweneel, who has incorporated many excerpts from it in his doctoral thesis, De Leer van de Mens ((Amsterdam: Buijten & Schippheijn, 1986). An extract from this thesis was published in English in W. J. Ouweneel: “Supratemporality in the Transcendental Anthropology of Dooyeweerd, ” Philosophia Reformata 58 (1993) 210-220, where Ouweneel says (at p. 213),
From around 1930 onward, this view of the Supratemporality of the heart or the religious root-unity of the cosmos becomes the essential, unchangeable, and indissoluble cornerstone of his thought. The pivotal place of this view in Dooyeweerd’s thought must be emphasised over against all those who have expressed objections to this view. They suppose that it is possible to drop this idea but to maintain the “rest” of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. They fail to see that the very core of his thought–the metaphor of the prism with its law of refraction, the law of concentration, the idea of the unity, fullness and totality of the religious root, the theory of time, the transcendental critique of thought–as well as the whole theory of the modalities, according to which the modalities are seen as “temporal aspects,” stand or fall with the idea of the supratemporality of the heart. The transcendence of the heart, as Dooyeweerd sees it, cannot be conceived as if the heart “points” within time to the supratemporal, as if it stands so to speak on the “boundary” of the temporal and the supratemporal, standing as it were on the shore of eternity but limited nevertheless to the beach. It is not the heart but the temporal modality of faith which Dooyeweerd calls a “border sphere” and an “open window to eternity.” The heart to him is always entirely above temporal diversity.
As Ouweneel points out, Dooyeweerd’s whole transcendental critique depends on this Idea of the supratemporal heart. I agree with that, since the three transcendental Ideas of Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique depend on distinguishing eternity, supratemporality and cosmic time. The question of the Origin refers to God’s eternity; the question of Totality refers to the supratemporal selfhood and religious root in the aevum or created eternity; the question of coherence relates to cosmic time. Those who deny the supratemporal selfhood, and who start from some other basis for Totality have fallen back into what Dooyeweerd calls “immanence philosophy.”
The supratemporal is therefore contrasted with the temporal or the immanent.
The supratemporal is sometimes also called the ‘heavenly’ as opposed to the temporal ‘earthly.’ The cosmic order of time is the limit to our ‘earthly’ temporal cosmos; cosmic time cannot contain the religious fullness of meaning.
Dooyeweerd considered using the words “central trans-cosmic time” for the supratemporal, but chose the term ‘supratemporal’ instead; to speak of central trans cosmic time still refers to cosmic time; that would be a duplication of the temporal horizon (NC I, 32-33).
The supratemporal is “the central sphere of occurrence.” (NC I, 32). All of our acts come out of our supratemporal center. They are expressed in our temporal functions.
Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the Idea of cosmic time is the basis of his philosophical theory of reality (NC I, 28), and that the idea of the supratemporal selfhood must be the presupposition of any truly Christian view of society:
Maar naar onze beschouwing, de Christelijke opvatting der persoonlijkheid, kan evenmin het ‘individueele ik’ in den tijd worden gezocht en daarmede nemen wij principieel tegen de ‘geesteswetenschappelijke sociologie’ positie, die zulks met de geheele immanentie philosophie juist wel doet. De individueele zelfheid is door en door religieus, boventijdelijk. In de kosmische tijdsorde kan nòch aan den individueelen mensch, nòch aan het verband zelfheid, ikheid toekomen. Dit is het cardinale uitgangspunt voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving. (De Crisis in de Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: Ten Have, 1931), p. 113.
[But according to our view, the Christian understanding of a person, the ‘individual I’ can no more be sought within time. And we thereby stand in principle against the position of sociology in the humanities, which seeks to do just this in its immanence philosophy. The individual selfhood is through and through religious, supratemporal. In the cosmic temporal order, selfhood or I-ness can be reached neither by [these sociological conceptions of] individual man, nor of societal structures. This is the principal point of departure for any truly Christian view of temporal society.]
In “De Zin der Geschiedenis in de ‘Leiding Gods’ in de Historische Ontwikkeling” (1932), Dooyeweerd said that the Christian religion has always taught that the supratemporal creaturely root of creation is not found in temporal reality nor in the temporal function of reason, but in the religious root of the human race. For out of the heart (which he says is the religious root of existence) are the issues of life. (Verburg 149)
And in Twilight of Western Thought (p. 125), Dooyeweerd says that the supratemporal selfhood as the religious root is the “key of knowledge” even for understanding the Christian Ground-Motive of creation, fall and redemption.
Some people argue that there is a difference between supertemporal and supratemporal, and that only the former really transcends time. This is wrong for three reasons: (1) The New Critique does use the term supertemporal in two places, but these are inconsistent translations for what in one case is the same word that is translated elsewhere as supratemporal [boventijdelijk], or for the same idea of transcending time that is elsewhere translated as ‘supratemporal.’ It is therefore an inconsistent translation (2) Elsewhere, Dooyeweerd confirms that our supratemporal heart really does transcend time [see discussion below]. (3) The argument doesn’t work as these critics would like. Their goal is to show that our supratemporal heart does not really transcend time. But these two quotations say precisely the opposite. It is our selfhood, our I-ness that is here said to be supertemporal. Our selfhood really does transcend time, and for the sake of consistency, the same word should be used: ‘supratemporal.’
If the concern of these critics is that our supratemporal heart is not eternal, then of course that is correct. But they make the mistake of assuming that the only two options are eternity and cosmic time. The supratemporal is the third option, that of the aevum [see discussion below].
See the following references where Dooyeweerd says that our selfhood transcends time:
In the Encyclopedia of Legal Science (1946), he says
This synthetic abstraction, this sub-traction, cannot be brought about by our logical function of consciousness itself. For as a subjective meaning-side of temporal reality, the logical function is itself within time.The meaning synthesis of scientific thought is first made possible when our self-consciousness, which as our selfhood is elevated above time, enters into its temporal meaning functions (p. 12).
In The Problem of Time in the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, he says at p. 179:
The theoretical synthesis is determined both by cosmic time as well as by the supratemporal transcendent selfhood.
Now it is indeed correct that we could have no true sense of time unless we did not go above time in the deepest part of our being. All merely temporal creatures lack a sense of time.
In our selfhood, we really transcend time:
According to my modest opinion, and in the light of the whole Scriptural revelation concerning human nature it is just this possession of a supratemporal root of life, with the simultaneous subjectedness to time of all its earthly expressions, that together belong to the essence [wezen] of man, to the image of God in him by means of which he is able to not only relatively but radically go out [uitgaan] above all temporal things. And that is how I also understand Ecclesiastes 3:11. [Dooyeweerd’s Second Response to Curators, Oct. 12, 1937, 34]
Totality is supratemporal, but we also function within temporal diversity. Man transcends time in his selfhood, but within the temporal coherence, man is universally-bound-to-time (NC I, 24). Dooyeweerd also says this in his 1960 article, “Van Peursen’s Critische Vragen bij “A New Critique of Theoretical Thought,” Philosophia Reformata 25 (1960, 97-150, at 103:
En slechts in en uit Hem leren wij in de gemeenschap van de H. Geest verstaan, in welke zin wij in het centrum onzer existentie de tijd te boven gaan, ofschoon wij tegelijk binnen de tijd besloten zijn [italics Dooyeweerd’s]
[And only in and from out of Him do we learn to understand, in the fellowship of the Holy Ghost, in what sense we transcend time in the center of our existence, whereas we are simultaneously limited within time.]
We are restricted and relativized by (but not at all to) our temporal cosmic existence (NC II, 561). We live in two worlds, the supratemporal and the temporal, and it is only because we have a supratemporal selfhood that we can have the Gegenstand-relation! The Gegenstand-relation allows us to form Ideas of the transcendental supratemporal conditions, while nevertheless remaining bound to philosophy:
Therefore by maintaining the Gegenstand-relation, the theoretical Idea relates the theoretical concept to the conditions of all theoretical thought, but itself remains theoretical in nature, thus within the bounds of philosophic thought. It is just in this that its transcendental character resides. For in theoretical thought, the transcendental is everything that, by means of the inner (immanent) structure of theoretical way of thought, first makes possible theoretical thought itself; the transcendental is everything that stands at the basis of every theoretical conceptual distinction as its theoretical presupposition (Encyclopedia, 2002 Edition, 80-81, re-translated by myself)
De mogelijkheid der zin-synthesis is slechts op te klaren vanuit de door ons vroeger summier aangegeven opvatting i.z. de structuur van het zelfbewustzijn. Het zelfbewustzijn transcendeert den kosmischen tijd, inzooverre de individueele zelfheid deel heeft aan den religieuzen wortel van het menschengeslacht, van welks zinvolheid alle tijdelijke zin-functies (zoowel natuur- als geestesfuncties) slechts tijdelijke zinbrekingen zijn. Het is immanent aan den kosmischen tijd, in zoovere onze bewustzijnsfuncties in de kosmische tijdsorde zijn ingevlochten. De a-logische zinfuncties zijn niet vreemd aan het zelfbesuwtzijn. Ze zijn alle gezamenlijk eigen aan onze zelfheid. Alleen daarom kunnen wij ze in hare zin-wetmatigheid leeren kennen (De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer, in het licht eener Calvinistische kosmologie en kennistheorie (1931), 103)
[The possibility of meaning-synthesis can only be explained on the basis of what we previously said in a more summary manner concerning the structure of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness transcends cosmic time, insofar as the individual selfhood participates in the religious root of the human race, from whose fullness of meaning all temporal meaning-functions (both natural as well as spiritual functions) are only temporal refractions. Self-consciousness is immanent within cosmic time, insofar as our functions of consciousness are interwoven within the cosmic order of time. The a-logical meaning functions are not foreign to our self-consciousness. They are all together owned by our selfhood. It is only because of this that we can learn to know them in their meaningful conformity to law.]
How could I really be aware of a sweet taste, if I could not relate this sensory impression to myself, by means of my intuition entering into the cosmic stream of time? (NC II, 478).
Dooyeweerd distinguishes among eternity, aevum and cosmic time. These distinctions are related to the idea of our creation in the image of God. Just as the meaning of our selfhood is found only in God, so the meaning of the temporal world is found in humanity, its Root (NC I, 55). To reject Dooyeweerd’s view of levels of time, the supratemporal, and eternity will therefore entail a rejection of Dooyeweerd’s view of the image of God, the Christian Ground Motive of creation, fall and redemption, the Idea of religious root, and his ideas of incarnation and redemption. It also will affect our understanding of his view of theoretical thought and the nature of our pre-theoretical thought. We cannot even understand modal aspects without relating them to the supratemporal religious root. In 1975, two years before his death, Dooyeweerd wrote his last article, “De Kentheoretische Gegenstandsrelatie en de Logische Subject-Objectrelatie,” Philosophia Reformata 40 (1975) 83-101. He says that the ideas of the irreducibility of the modal spheres and their coherence are not to be separated from the transcendental idea of their root-unity in the religious center of human existence. As we have seen, this “religious center” is what Dooyeweerd calls the “key of knowledge.”
These philosophical Ideas are therefore all inter-related. We cannot reject Dooyeweerd’s Idea of supratemporality without affecting the rest of his philosophy.
If we reject the Idea of supratemporality, our philosophy will be what Dooyeweerd calls ‘immanence philosophy.’ See my article Dooyeweerd versus Strauss: Objections to Immanence Philosophy.” And see also my article, Why did Dooyeweerd want to pull out his hair?“
There is a good possibility that Dooyeweerd obtained his term ‘supratemporal’ from Baader. Or, he may have obtained the word from J.H. Gunning, Jr. See J.H. Gunning, Christian Theosophy and Reformational Philosophy. Gunning was influenced by Baader, and who in turn influenced both Abrham Kuyper and Dooyeweerd. The term ‘supratemporal’ is a literal translation of the word ‘überzeitlich’ that is used by Baader. This word, ‘überzeitlich,’ is very unusual. . You will not find it in German dictionaries. I don’t know whether this means that it was coined by Baader or whether he obtained it from older, obsolete German usage. The Dutch word used by Dooyeweerd, ‘boventijdelijk’ is also an unusual word; it has the same meaning. Gunning acknowledges that this word ‘boventijdelijk’ is unusual. In “Concerning the Concept of Time,” Baader uses the phrase, ‘über die zeitliche,’ or ‘above the temporal’ [See Endnote 20 in my translation, or footnote 5 in the original]. In section 18 of “Elementary Concepts Concerning Time,” Baader refers to the supratemporal [überzeitlichen] region. And as is done by Dooyeweerd, this supratemporal region is distinguished both from God’s Eternity and from the temporality of the cosmos.
For Baader, the true time is this supratemporal (überzeitlich); it encompasses a past, present and future. Our heart, the religious root, exists in this supratemporal, or true time.
Then there is cosmic time, which Baader also calls ‘appearance time’ [Scheinzeit]. It is the time governing the world in which things appear. It has only a past and a future, but no present (Werke II, 27). In cosmic time, there is only a present-less and separated one thing after another [“nacheinander und auseinander”] (Zwiespalt 57). That is the status of the temporal world other than humans.
Finally, there is the false time, or subtemporal, in which the demons live. It has only a past. Baader obtained the idea of these three levels of time from St. Martin (Fermenta VI, 17).
Dooyeweerd does not specifically refer to a false time. But he does say that the law for cosmic time is a restraint that keeps reality from falling into nothingness (Roots37). He does not speculate on what reality will be like when this restraint no longer exists. He says he does not know what the full effect of unrestrained sin on reality would be like. Thanks to God this unhampered influence does not exist in our earthly [temporal] cosmos [NC II, 33].
Cosmic time is thus in between the supratemporal and the subtemporal, and we are preparing for our final state. Sometimes we have glimpses of the supratemporal. This is the Silberblick. Or we have glimpses of the truly horrible, the infernal or what Baader called the subtemporal. Kuyper refers to Baader’s ideas about this.
Baader says that our Existenz relates to our central being that is free of time and space (Elementarbegriffe 560). Both Baader and Dooyeweerd distinguish supratemporality from the eternity of God. Baader says that Spinoza’s idea of a “temporal eternity” confuses the Creator with the creature in a pantheistic way (Elementarbegriffe, 538).
And both Baader and Dooyeweerd reject the Greek view of eternity as static and unchanging. Baader says, “Eternity has previously been mistakenly represented as an unmoving and static present” (Zeit, 21). Dooyeweerd emphasizes that eternity as not static like the Greek metaphysical view of time (NC I, 31 ft, and 106).
Dooyeweerd also speaks of the eschatological aspect of time, that which happens beyond the limits of cosmic time. It is known in faith (NC I, 32, 33). The eschatological is what happens beyond the limits of cosmic time. It is in this sense that we are to understand the “days of creation,” the initial words of the book of Genesis, and the order in which regeneration precedes conversion.
Revised Jan 29/08; Dec 24/16
J. Glenn Friesen 